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Introduction	The	impact	of	entrepreneurship	in	the	United	States	is	legendary.	Entrepreneurship	makes	an	impact	personally,	encouraging	businessmen	and	women	that	success	is	possible	with	hard	work	and	luck.	Entrepreneurship	makes	an	impact	nationally,	creating	pop	icons	that	stand	as	spokespeople	for	the	mystique	of	creative	geniuses	(Reich	1987).	Although,	entrepreneurship	makes	such	a	large	impact	on	our	nation	and	globe	it	still	seems	that	many	people	believe	in	the	mysterious	success	of	both	small	entrepreneurial	ventures	and	large	publically	offered	entrepreneurial	corporations.	The	success	is	no	mystery;	it	is	rather	a	great	deal	of	hard	work	by	a	small	or	large	group	of	people.	The	reality	of	entrepreneurship,	as	proven	empirically	by	Martin	Ruef	in	The	Entrepreneurial	Group,	is	people	work	in	small	demographically	similar	groups	that	are	isolated	in	geographic	locations	and	held	together	by	strong	collective	ties	and	collective	goals	(Ruef	2010).		The	more	accurate	story	of	the	entrepreneur	is	one	who	works	closely	with	a	small	intimate	group	of	4	–	5	people	tediously	over	an	extended	amount	of	time	to	dream,	create,	and	produce	innovation.	The	best	way	to	start	the	story	of	entrepreneurship	is	to	start	in	the	beginning,	entrepreneurial	group	formation.			Philosophers	and	sociologists	have	studied	group	formation	for	years	and	therefore,	the	literatures	are	quite	extensive.	Group	formation	starts	with	the	study	of	the	individual	and	their	intention	to	act.	Methodological	individualists	believe	that	individuals	have	intentions	that	are	always	self-interested	and	rational.	Their	
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intentions	cannot	be	rolled	up	to	an	aggregate	group,	and	any	social	group	formation	is	present	because	of	large	powerful	institutions	in	place.	Methodological	holists	believe	that	individuals	have	intentions	that	are	often	times	self-interested	and	rational.	Their	intentions	can	be	rolled	up	to	an	aggregate	group	and	form	social	groups	that	provide	utility	to	the	individual.	There	are	some	methodological	holists	that	believe	that	not	only	can	intentions	be	rolled	up	to	an	aggregate	group	but	that	individuals	can	have	intentions	that	only	exist	within	the	context	of	a	group.	These	intentions	are	often	called	‘we-intentions’	or	‘collective-intentions’.	When	individuals	acting	out	of	collective	intentionality	form	groups,	the	group,	as	a	representative	whole	of	the	individuals,	is	able	to	act	with	group	agency.		Group	agency	is	a	phenomenon	that	we	see	in	entrepreneurship;	a	group	of	people	with	collective	intention	and	collective	action	working	for	a	collective	good	are	able	to	use	a	spokesperson	for	their	entrepreneurial	group.			In	this	paper	I	use	multiple	fields	to	study	group	entrepreneurship:	philosophy,	economics,	and	ecology.	The	philosophers	contribute	to	the	study	of	the	social	ontology	of	groups.	The	economists	contribute	the	impact	the	peculiar	behaviors	of	entrepreneurs	have	on	free	market	economics.		The	ecologists	provide	a	method	of	study	to	measure	and	monitor	interactions	of	the	individual	with	the	environment.	It	is	the	combination	of	all	three	fields	that	allows	each	field	to	agree	to	group	entrepreneurship	is	real	in	the	most	simplest	of	terms:	people	work	together.		The	dispute	arises	when	each	of	the	fields	compare	their	assumptions	of	the	world	they	live	in.	Depending	on	the	‘breed’	of	philosopher	you	meet,	either	methodological	
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individualists	or	methodological	holists,	they	are	motivated	by	the	individual’s	own	agency	to	achieve	group	action.	Economists	are	convinced	that	all	individuals	are	rational	and	no	group	action	is	rational.	The	ecologists	perceive	group	action	as	natural	(as	in	social	animals)	and	have	developed	a	method	for	studying	such	action.	Can	we	combine	the	insights	of	philosophers,	economists,	and	ecologist	to	study	group	entrepreneurship?	That	is,	can	we	model	how	latent	entrepreneurs	search	the	economic	landscape	for	partners	in	the	economic	functions	of	new	venture	formation?	This	work	reflects	the	work	in	these	fields	completed	to	date.			In	this	paper	I	defend	group	entrepreneurship	through	an	extensive	literature	review	of	collective	intentionality	and	group	agency	leading	to	an	agent-based	model	of	group	formation.		I	believe	collective	intentionality	is	the	motivation	for	the	action	of	group	formation.	However,	because	of	the	complexity	of	human	nature	the	philosophers	who	study	intentionality	cannot	agree	on	one	definition.	Michael	Bratman,	Margaret	Gilbert,	and	Raimo	Tuomela	all	have	different	mechanisms	for	how	individual	we-intentionality	leads	to	group	agency.	I	will	systematically	break	down	and	compare	all	three	theories	finishing	my	analysis	with	a	comparison	in	agent-based	modeling	using	NetLogo.	Agent-based	modeling	allows	for	a	model	simulation	of	group	behavior	and	emergent	phenomena	while	accounting	for	the	differences	in	individuals,	local	interactions,	and	adaptive	behavior	of	the	individuals.		The	appeal	for	agent-based	modeling	in	the	study	of	group	entrepreneurship	comes	from	the	ability	to	account	for	local	interactions	and	monitor	group	behavior	simultaneously.		
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Literature	Review	 	A	review	of	literature	in	support	of	the	agent-based	modeling	of	collective	entrepreneurship	includes	three	major	areas	of	prior	study:	collective	entrepreneurship,	group	agency	and	intentionality,	and	agent-based	modeling.	I	will	discuss	each	of	these	in	turn,	drawing	implication	for	model	development	in	the	next	chapter.	
An	Introduction	to	Collective	Entrepreneurship		It	is	difficult	to	find	one	clear	and	concise	definition	of	collective	entrepreneurship	in	the	literature.	I	believe	this	is	because	the	strong	definitions	and	ongoing	debate	both	‘collective’	and	‘entrepreneurship’	bring	independently.	Combining	theories	of	collective	action	and	entrepreneurship	can	create	strong	preconceived	notions	as	to	who,	what,	where,	when,	and	how	the	organizations	and	firms	are	formed	and	operating.	To	clearly	define	collective	entrepreneurship	for	the	context	of	this	paper	I	will	develop	the	view	of	‘collective’	as	this	paper	is	concerned	and	present	the	meaningful	work	done	on	collective	entrepreneurship	for	the	last	20	years.	
Collective	Action	in	the	Context	of	Collective	Entrepreneurship	Originally	the	study	of	collective	action	was	centered	on	collectives	created	for	the	management	of	common	pool	resources.	This	approach	assumes	that	all	individuals	are	rational	actors	interested	only	in	their	individual	payoff,	and	are	only	willing	to	be	a	part	of	the	collective	to	receive	the	highest	payoff.	Mancur	Olson	comments	to	the	strong	implications	of	rational	action	by	individuals.		
“Unless	the	number	of	individuals	is	quite	small,	or	unless	there	is	coercion	or	
some	other	special	device	to	make	individuals	act	in	their	common	interest,	
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rational,	self-interested	individuals	will	not	act	to	achieve	their	common	or	
group	interest”.	(Olson,	1971	p.	5-6)		Following	Olson,	Elinor	Ostrom	(1990)	described	eight	‘special	devices’	to	insure	stability	of	common	pool	resource	institutions;	clearly	defined	boundaries,	congruence	between	appropriation	and	provision	rules	and	local	conditions,	collective-choice	arrangements,	monitoring,	graduated	sanctions,	conflict-resolution	mechanisms,	minimal	recognition	of	rights	to	organize,	and	nested	enterprises.		Based	on	Ostrom’s	work	the	study	of	collective	action	grew	dramatically.	Many	firms,	collective	by	nature	of	their	business	structures,	used	her	design	principles	to	study	and	encourage	the	creation	and	management	of	a	collective	good	(Zajac	1993).	To-date	Ostrom’s	approach	to	collective	action	has	been	used	to	explain	institutions	governing	common	resources	and	large	social	movements	(Zajac	1993).		Traditionally,	collective	action	was	not	applied	to	firms	within	in	the	private	sector	because	of	the	absence	of	a	common-pool	resource	and	the	presence	of	a	clear-cut	structure	instituting	different	mechanisms	of	motivation	for	the	individuals	involved	in	the	firm.	However,	over	time	the	principles	presented	by	Ostrom	have	leaked	into	the	study	of	management	of	firms,	including	entrepreneurial	firms.	Instead,	entrepreneurial	firms	should	be	considered	outside	the	bounds	of	the	study	of	collective	action	and	considered	its	own	unique	field	of	study	with	particular	‘special	devices’	that	explain	the	motivation	for	entrepreneurs	to	“have	an	active	interest	in	recruiting	others	to	work	for	them,	as	co-founders,	employees,	investors,	
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advisors,	or	unpaid	helpers”	(Ruef	2010	p.	7)	to	form	a	‘social	group’	pursuing	a	collective	good	for	the	betterment	of	all	individuals	involved.	Collective	entrepreneurship	is	the	study	of	such	a	‘social	group’.			Interests	and	motivations	for	the	study	of	collective	entrepreneurship	will	differ	based	on	the	perspective	of	entrepreneurship	(Buress	2009).		Heidi	Tuominen	(2014)	and	colleagues	identified	eight	manifestations	of	collective	entrepreneurship:			 1. Embedded	in	a	social	and	institutional	scene	of	market	and	industry	actors	and	relations	2. Application	of	social	skills	the	entrepreneur	(singular)	uses	as	the	mobilizer	of	actors	or	resources	in	network	of	collaborative	processes	3. Joint	action	guided	by	social	values	and	aiming	at	collective	outcomes	(especially	of	those	of	co-operatives)	4. 	A	specific	mode	of	governance	of	co-operatives	that	is	based	on	joint	ownership	and	control	5. Market-driven	and	contractual	collaboration	in	the	form	of	the	structure	of	multiparty	alliances,	networks,	or	vertical	integration	6. Collaboration	between	employees	in	different	organizations	highlighting	occupational	identity	in	advocating	a	common	causes	7. Work	and	collaboration	among	employees	
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8. Teams	in	established	organizations,	and	the	establishment	of	teams	in	managing	new	business	ventures.			For	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	I	am	interested	in	the	study	of	number	eight,	the	entrepreneurial	group	as	a	team.		
Current	Work	on	Collective	Entrepreneurship		Martin	Ruef	is	at	the	forefront	of	the	study	of	collective	entrepreneurship	with	a	team	perspective.	In	his	book	The	Entrepreneurial	Group,	Ruef	uses	empirical	evidence	from	The	Panel	Study	of	Entrepreneurial	Dynamics	I	&	II	covering	data	from	1998	–	2000	and	2005	–	2006	to	provide	support	for	the	existence	of	entrepreneurial	groups.	For	purposes	of	this	literature	review	we	will	assume	Ruef’s	conclusion	that	entrepreneurial	groups	exist	(both	as	high	growth	companies	and	small	businesses)	to	be	true	and	focus	on	structure	of	the	entrepreneurial	groups,	most	importantly	the	relationships	and	identities	of	individuals	involved	in	entrepreneurial	groups.			The	entrepreneurial	group	is	not	a	new	phenomenon.	In	the	late	1800s	Max	Weber	identified	and	studied	the	start	of	business	groups	in	medieval	commercial	partnership	in	Europe	(Weber	1958).	Weber’s	study	was	for	concern	of	control	–	how	are	individuals	able	to	give	up	control	of	their	firm	(profits,	benefits,	etc.)	to	work	with	a	partner?	Weber	started	with	the	Romans.	They	treated	partnerships	and	the	individuals	in	those	partnerships,	for	concern	of	law	enforcement,	as	one	in	the	same.	However,	as	trade	increased	in	volume	and	distance,	distinctions	between	
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the	individual	and	business	were	needed	for	the	advance	of	the	enterprise.	To	protect	their	family’s	personal	wealth,	separate	partnership	structures	were	used	to	keep	the	assets	of	the	partnership	and	the	individual	separate.	Developments	in	Germanic	law	allowed	the	emergence	of	joint	households;	followed	by	the	creation	of	solidary	liability	(Weber	2003).	Joint	households	allowed	for	individuals	to	be	held	responsible	for	the	debts	of	other	individuals	under	the	same	roof.	Solidary	liability	is	the	acceptance	that	one	individual	can	be	held	responsible	for	the	partnership’s	(or	joint	households)	debts.		This	example	is	an	indicator	of	the	social	power	associated	with	such	groups	(Ruef	2010).				Over	time,	the	perception	of	an	entrepreneur	in	the	United	States	morphed	to	a	prime	time	television	star	or	a	rags	to	riches	story	featured	in	the	national	press	for	the	success	of	creating	a	high	growth	company.	Why	do	we	allow	the	high	profile	views	of	a	small	segment	of	entrepreneurial	stories	influence	the	way	we	think	about	what	entrepreneurial	success	looks	like?	Academic	literature	has	also	played	a	role	in	perception	of	entrepreneurial	success;	business	management	literature	over-romanticizes	entrepreneurship	while	the	social	science	perspective	removes	the	trees	from	the	forest	in	study	of	entrepreneurial	dynamics,	studying	details	that	are	often	out	of	context.	The	overall	result	in	the	literature	has	created	a	dreamy	entrepreneurial	experience	by	highly	intelligent	people	who	have	the	traits	and	behaviors	that	produce	large	economic	gains.		I	believe	that	aspects	of	the	true	entrepreneurship	have	yet	to	be	uncovered	because	of	the	crutches	business	management	and	social	science,	in	their	study	of	entrepreneurship,	rely	upon.		
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	During	the	21st	century,	the	fields	of	business	management	and	social	science	worked	to	understand	and	quantify	the	phenomenon	of	entrepreneurship.	Each	discipline	took	a	different	approach	in	understanding	the	nuances	of	the	entrepreneurial	group.		In	the	field	of	business	management	Ruef	reviewed	16	empirical	articles	from	1990	–	2007	focusing	on	entrepreneurial	groups	(2010,	p.	20).	All	of	the	articles	used	high	growth	companies	with	high	capitalization.	Many	of	the	companies	were	in	high	profile	fields;	including	health	care,	high-tech,	and	academic	spin-offs.	Eighteen	percent	of	the	firms	studied	were	Fortune	500	companies.	The	overall	intent	of	each	article	(when	considered	singularly)	was	never	to	give	a	skewed	picture	of	entrepreneurship.	However,	the	lasting	effect	of	the	articles,	considered	collectively,	portrays	high	profile	businesses	with	extraordinary	success.	The	realities	of	entrepreneurship	in	the	United	States	are	not	as	business	management	literature,	or	pop	culture	for	that	matter,	portray	it.	Rather,	the	most	common	entrepreneurial	venture	in	the	United	States	is	building	construction	followed	by	direct	and	Internet	selling	(Ruef	2010	p	23).			Unfortunately,	the	social	science	field	perspective	does	not	provide	a	more	accurate	narrative	of	the	entrepreneurial	venture	in	the	United	States.	Ruef	explains:		
While	scholars	in	the	interdisciplinary	field	of	business	management	generally	
consider	a	mixture	of	social	psychological,	structural,	and	economic	
mechanisms	driving	group	composition	and	its	effects	on	the	performance	of	
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startup	enterprises,	social	scientists	tend	to	adopt	a	more	myopic	view.	
Economists	explaining	the	distribution	of	ownership	and	control	rights	in	new	
business	ventures	ignore	the	relevant	effects	of	kinship,	ethnicity,	or	gender.	
Sociologist	analyzing	the	recruitment	of	individuals	into	entrepreneurial	
groups	overlook	the	transactions	costs	that	may	place	some	exchange	partners	
within	a	group	and	others	outside	of	it	boundaries.”	(Ruef	2010	p.	31)		Social	science	works	to	quantify	a	broader	group	of	study	than	business	management.	Yet,	it	continues	to	ignore	too	many	variables	to	accurately	capture	the	true	phenomenon	of	entrepreneurship.	The	study	of	group	entrepreneurship	requires	a	different	approach	either	discipline	can	accurately	provide.			Fortunately	for	the	study	of	entrepreneurship	Martin	Ruef	is	unwilling	to	accept	the	business	management	or	social	science	approach	as	the	single	way	to	interpret	the	existence	of	social	groups	working	together	in	entrepreneurship.	Instead	Ruef	develops	a	‘relational	demography’	approach	to	explain	the	relationships	and	identities	that	hold	entrepreneurial	groups	together	once	group	formation	has	occurred.		1. Ruef’s	first	mechanism	is	ecological	constraint.	Ecological	constraint	acknowledges	the	environment	proximity	while	also	capturing	all	systems	(contracts,	plans,	etc.)	and	resources	(availability	of	critical	infrastructure)	in	the	‘environment’	that	can	support	or	inhibit	the	success	group	entrepreneurship.		
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2. The	second	mechanism,	strong	ties,	allows	entrance	of	the	family	firm	into	the	discussion	of	collective	entrepreneurship,	suggesting	that	‘entrepreneurial	groups	are	limited	by	preexisting	social	networks’	(Ruef	2010	p.	25).	The	strength	of	social	ties	allows	for	embeddedness	of	the	individuals	and	consequently	supporting	long-term	group	success.	Although	weak	ties	and	structural	holes	(Burt,	1992)	do	bring	value	of	new	information	to	groups,	they	do	not	support	long-term	stability	of	entrepreneurial	groups	(Ruef	2010).		3. Ruef’s	third	mechanism,	homophilous	affiliation,	describes	similar	sociodemographic	characteristics	between	individuals.	Similarities	in	the	individuals	do	three	things;	first,	encourage	individuals	to	believe	that	their	common	social	identity	means	they	think	alike	(McPherson	et	al.	2001),	second,	dispose	each	individual	to	higher	levels	of	attraction	and	trust	(Boone	et	al.	2004),	and	third,	insinuate	the	existence	of	loyalty	and	ultimately	highest	personal	power	(Ruef	2010	p.	36).		4. Ruef’s	final	mechanism	is	the	goal	orientation	of	the	individual.	This	is	the	subjective	goal	of	the	individuals	and	their	desired	success.	In	the	context	of	a	shared	identity,	success	is	defined	as	ultimate	identify	fulfillment	and	not	profits.					
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Table	1:	Summary	of	Ruef’s	Relation	Demography	Approach	(2010	p.	34)		 	 High	Visibility	 Lower	Visibility	Relationship	 Ecological	Constraint	 Strong	Tie	Constraint	
Identities	 Homophilous	Affiliation	 Identity	Fulfillment		
Mechanisms	of	Group	Formation	Historically	individual	action	has	been	the	basis	of	economic	research,	reducing	macro-economic	patterns	to	rational	individual	action.	This	approach	studied	the	economic	environment	during	a	single	snapshot	in	time	while	the	economy	was	in	an	equilibrium	state.	During	equilibrium,	the	individuals	are	static	and	have	no	motivation	for	change.	However,	a	majority	of	the	economy	operates	outside	of	equilibrium	(Arthur	2013)	and	the	study	of	individuals	outside	the	boundaries	of	equilibrium	can	no	longer	rely	upon	static	models	and	rational	actor	theory.	Social	science	has	the	opportunity	to	reevaluate	the	micro-levels	inside	the	larger	macro-system	to	deduce	the	correct	unit	of	study	when	it	comes	to	economic	activity	through	entrepreneurship.			Martin	Ruef	reminds	us	that	entrepreneurial	groups	spur	most	entrepreneurial	activity	(Ruef	2010).		But,	can	social	science	be	based	on	group	action	or	only	individual	action?	Those	that	admit	the	relevance	of	group	process	are	
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methodological	holists.	Those	that	require	an	individual	or	micro-foundational	approach	are	methodological	individualists.	The	study	of	group	entrepreneurship	requires	both	an	individualistic	and	holistic	approach,	resulting	in	a	hybrid	methodology.	We	must	study	the	intentions	of	the	individuals	to	keep	sight	of	the	micro	picture,	while	remembering	that	the	groups	are	the	agents	active	in	the	macro	economy.		However	if	we	are	to	make	the	leap	from	individuals	to	groups	we	must	understand	group	formation.	Philosophers	explain	group	formation	by	analyzing	the	individual	intentionality	of	group	members.	Once	individuals	begin	working	together	the	individuals	may	no	longer	be	acting	on	behalf	of	themselves	but	also	act	for	the	other	members	of	the	group,	and	ultimately	the	group	itself.	Such	individuals	are	practicing	we-intentionality.			The	trigger	for	group	of	individuals	to	change	to	a	group	is	the	study	of	agency.	The	achievement	of	group	agency,	via	we-intentionality,	is	an	indicator	for	the	establishment	of	collective	entrepreneurship.		When	all	group	members	recognize	each	other’s	we-intention	(key	word:	recognize)	group	agency	occurs.	Group	agency	then	acts	as	a	vehicle	to	move	social	science	from	the	study	of	individual	action	to	the	study	of	group	action.	The	justification	for	group	action	allows	a	new	perspective,	outside	of	rational	actor	theory	(closely	tied	to	methodological	individualism)	to	make	a	more	appealing	argument	for	the	study	of	group	entrepreneurship	within	the	context	of	studying	the	group	in	its	entirety	(include	the	‘special	devices’	holding	the	group	together),	not	just	the	chosen	leader	or	representative	for	the	group.		
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	To	clearly	answer	the	question,	of	whether	social	science	can	be	based	on	group	action	or	only	individual	action,	I	will	review	methodological	individualism	and	methodological	holism	while	constantly	acknowledging	the	hybrid	perspective	that	acts	as	the	theoretical	framework	for	this	paper.	Then,	I	will	provide	an	extensive	literature	review	of	we-intentionality.	Finally,	to	complete	the	argument	I	will	present	theories	of	group	agency.		
Theoretical	framework		Group	formation	starts	with	the	study	of	the	individual	and	their	intention	to	act	collectively.	Methodological	individualists	believe	that	individuals	have	intentions	that	are	always	self-interested	and	rational.	They	also	believe	intentions	cannot	be	combined	to	form	a	group	aggregate.	(Any	social	group	formation	present	is	because	pre-existing	institutions.)	Methodological	holists	believe	that	individuals	have	intentions	that	are	often	times	self-interested	and	rational.	Contrary	to	individualist,	holists’	believe	intentions	can	be	combined	to	form	a	group	aggregate	ultimately	forming	social	groups	that	provide	utility	to	the	individual	group	members.	There	are	some	methodological	holists	that	believe	that	not	only	can	intentions	be	combined	to	form	an	aggregate	group,	but	that	individuals	can	have	intentions	that	have	meaning	only	in	group	action	(Tuomela	2013	p.15).	This	paper	relies	on	the	fact	that	individuals	exploit	utility,	value,	and	worth	from	group	action,	and	therefore	require	the	rigorous	study	of	group	agency,	formation,	and	motivation.			
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Methodological	Individualism		The	study	of	entrepreneurship	has	been	examined	with	a	methodological	individualism	approach,	nearly	always	assuming	a	single	entrepreneur.	Joseph	Schumpeter	suggested	superhero	like	abilities	to	single	innovative	entrepreneurs,	with	traits	of	“supernormal	qualities	of	intellect	and	will”	(Raines	and	Leather	2000:	377;	Harper	2008).	Max	Weber,	although	a	scholar	of	partnerships	and	group	behavior,	noted	that	a	single	individual	is	the	first	representative	of	the	enterprise.	Furthermore,	Weber	is	credited	in	his	work	Protestant	Ethic	and	the	Spirit	of	
Capitalism	for	taking	a	methodological	individualism	approach	and	tracing	the	total	impact	and	suggested	the	future	power	of	entrepreneurial	work,	at	the	macro	level,	to	one	individual’s	actions	(Coleman	1986).	In	these	examples,	no	value	is	given	to	the	relationships	connecting	the	micro	level	decisions	with	the	macro	level	outcomes;	instead	they	are	removing	the	relational	aspect	from	the	economical	progress	discussion.		The	study	of	the	individual	and	the	individual’s	actions	in	economics	begins	with	the	theory	of	methodological	individualism.		Joseph	Schumpeter	was	the	first	to	use	the	phrase	in	1908;	however,	his	definition	was	much	different	than	the	‘rational	choice	theory’	associated	with	methodological	individualism	today.	In	the	Value	of	Self,	Schumpeter	presents	a	method	that	reduces	individual	action	down	to	individual	intentions	that	are	absent	of	influences	of	social	systems	to	effectively	investigate	microeconomic	actions.	Although	there	was	some	consideration	on	the	absence	of	social	structure	it	was	not	a	main	focus	of	Schumpeter’s	study	(Heath	2013).	Methodological	individualism	was	not	again	discussed	in	the	literature	for	another	
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two	decades.		Friedrich	Hayek	stated	that	all	action	is	individual	action	and	under	no	influence	at	all	by	any	social	structure	or	institutions	(Heath	2013).	By	the	time	Hayek	was	writing,	individualism	was	a	defensive	move	to	justify	and	explain	social	and	macro	phenomenon	while	maintaining	the	philosophical	importance	of	the	individual	(Heath	2013).		This	definition,	although	definite	and	not	ambiguous,	has	been	analyzed	and	redefined	numerous	times.	All	definitions	since	Hayek’s	discussion	agree	that	individuals	are	the	reasons	for	social	phenomena,	however	the	disagreement	arises	as	to	whether	relations	between	individuals	should	be	included	in	the	discussion	of	social	phenomena,	such	as	group	action	(Udehn	2001).		Woven	into	the	fabric	of	human	nature	is	a	desire	and	ability	to	interact	with	other	humans.	It	seems	nearly	impossible	to	separate	individuals	from	the	influence	of	these	interactions	and	the	social	structure	humans	themselves	construct	in	their	daily	lives.	Joseph	Agassi	was	convinced	that	social	phenomena	operate	under	the	influence	of	the	social	norms	and	constructs	in	society.	Agassi	suggested	that	social	phenomena	occur	because	of	‘institutionalistic	individualism”,	not	methodological	individualism	(Agassi	1960).		Institutionalistic	individualism	accepts	the	influence	of	the	current	social	structure	on	individuals	as	they	form	new	social	structure	or	phenomena.	This	theory	provides	the	freedom	in	the	theory	of	the	individual	to	accurately	capture	the	true	pressures	and	influences	on	individuals	as	their	intentions	morph	into	actions.	In	contrast,	methodological	individualism	requires	a	conceptual	framework,	which	does	not	account	for	in	individual	action,	to	understand	the	world	that	individuals	act	in.	Geoffrey	Hodgson	continues	the	
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argument	on	the	influence	of	the	existence	of	institutions,	institutions	as	small	as	existing	relationships,	in	individual	action	with	his	‘folk	theorem’	of	social	situations.	Hodgson	suggests,	“When	explanations	are	reduced	to	individuals,	interactive	relations	between	individuals	are	also	always	involved.”	(Hodgson	2007)	
Methodological	Holism	The	opposite	approach	of	methodological	individualism	for	the	analysis	of	individual	and	social	action	is	methodological	holism	or	collectivism.	Holism	considers	the	social	structures	and	influences	around	the	individual	to	be	a	part	of	the	individual.	It	goes	further	and	suggests	that	all	individuals	are	interdependent	upon	others	and	the	social	structures	around	them	currently	and	in	the	past	(Oyserman	2002).	Holism	proposes,	“the	group	or	society	is	metaphysically	real	–	and	the	individual	is	a	mere	abstraction,	a	fiction”	(Oyserman	2002)	that	provides	“…demonstrably	fallacious	inferences	about	the	dynamics	of	collective	action”	(Oyserman	2002).	In	contrast	to	individualism	the	measure	of	value,	worth,	and	independence	in	holism	is	placed	on	the	social	reality	(including	social	institutions	in	place	that	are	influencing	the	individual)	instead	of	the	individual.	The	use	of	holism	in	relation	to	the	study	of	human	interaction	creates	an	interesting	perspective	of	entrepreneurial	group	formation.	Individualism	put	little	emphasis	on	motivations	for	group	behavior.	While,	holism	supports	group	agency,	it	forfeits	group	formation	as	an	emergent	quality	of	individual	intentions.	Oyserman,	Coon,	and	Kemmelneir	identify	two	consequences	of	holism	that	disrupt	consideration	of	the	individual	in	the	entrepreneurial	group;	1)	group	membership	is	a	central	aspect	
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of	identity	and	2)	valued	personal	traits	reflect	the	goals	of	collectivism	(Oyserman	2002).		
Hybrid	Approach	to	Social	Action	Theory	There	are	some	methodological	holists	that	believe	that	not	only	can	intentions	be	combined	into	to	an	aggregate	group	but	that	individuals	can	also	have	intentions	that	only	have	meaning	in	group	action	(Schweikard	2013).	These	intentions	are	often	called	‘we-intentions’	or	‘collective-intentions’.	When	individuals	acting	out	of	collective	intentionality	form	groups,	the	group,	as	a	representative	of	its	members,	is	able	to	act	with	group	agency.	It	is	valuable	to	notice	that	to	reach	group	agency	the	individual	intentions	present	were	necessary	to	the	existence	of	group	agency.	The	individual	action	cannot	be	explained	by	either	methodological	individualism	or	methodological	holism.	Individualism	does	not	allow	the	existence	of	group	agency.	Holism	will	not	allow	individuals	to	act	on	their	own	accord	although	they	are	a	part	of	the	group.	It	is	important	in	the	study	of	entrepreneurship	to	abandon	the	theory	of	methodological	individualism	and	adopt	a	hybrid	methodological	approach.				My	paper	is	not	the	first	paper	to	propose	a	hybrid	of	methodological	individualism	and	holism	when	discussing	group	agency.	Raimo	Tuomela	(2013)	came	to	the	same	conclusion,	methodological	individualism	does	not	allow	for	group	agency	but	holism	does	not	allow	for	individuals	to	make	individual	decisions	that	result	in	emergent	behavior.	The	study	of	entrepreneurial	groups	and	their	emergent	sociality	requires	a	hybrid	approach.	I	will	use	Tuomela’s	approach	for	the	study	of	group	entrepreneurship:	“My	(Tuomela)	weakly	collectivistic	approach	is	
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nevertheless	far	from	full-blown	anti-individualism,	because	it	does	not	regard	groups	as	intrinsically	intentional	agents,	but	rather	characterizes	individual	human	beings	as	the	only	agentive	causal	motors	in	the	social	world.	In	a	nutshell,	groups	accordingly	can	act	only	through	their	members	activities”	(2013	p.	13).		Tuomela	is	an	individualist	for	agency,	yet	a	holist	for	intention.		
We	-	Intentionality		I	accept	that	neither	individuals	nor	groups	have	preeminent	power	over	the	actions	of	individuals,	but	rather	the	individual’s	choice	to	participate	(for	the	betterment	of	the	individual	and	the	group)	in	group	action	is	an	important	force.	The	focus	of	study	is	the	individual-level	mechanism	in	place	to	justify	group	formation	from	the	individual’s	perspective.	Through	the	use	of	thought	experiments,	philosophers	have	been	studying	the	mechanism	for	individual	action	for	centuries.	For	the	purpose	of	this	paper	I	will	study	the	individual	mechanism	for	group	formation,	we-intentionality,	from	the	perspective	of	social	ontology.	This	provides	a	unique	perspective	for	social	scientists	to	draw	connections	in	a	macro	economy	that	is	driven	by	micro	decisions.		Regardless	of	your	belief	in	methodological	individualism	or	holism,	it	is	a	commonly	held	view	that	a	person	is	considered	an	intentional	agent,	assuming	individual	agency.	For	the	purpose	of	this	paper	I	will	agree	with	the	assessment	of	individual	intentionality	that	Raimo	Tuomela	makes	in	Social	Ontology,			
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“Intentionality	contains	the	following	central	elements:	intentional	agents	can	
have	representational	mental	states	such	as	beliefs,	wants,	and	intentions,	and	
they	can	also	have	emotions	and	feelings	with	their	bodily	accompaniments.	On	
the	ground	of	these	kinds	of	states,	agents	in	the	full	sense	are	capable	of	
intentional	action,	which	typically	is	action	for	a	reason.	Intentional	human	
agents	are	also	taken	to	understand	normativity	and	to	be	capable	of	obeying	
norms,	for	examples	the	norms	involved	in	promises	and	agreements	and	those	
involved	in	communal	laws	and	informal	social	norms.	Accordingly,	human	
agents	are	both	causally	and	morally	responsible	for	their	intentional	actions.”	
(2013	p.21)		Social	ontology,	or	the	study	of	shaped	mental	states	(i.e.	intentionality	and	action)	provides	a	unique	contrast	to	individual	intention	as	a	basis	for	group	formation	discussion.	To	use	social	ontology	to	explain	group	agency	we	must	first	assume	two	things:	1)	that	individual	action	through	group	behavior	is	an	observer	relative	observation	that	is	critical	to	entrepreneurial	group	formation	and	2)	we	must	make	provisions	in	the	concept	of	social	ontology	to	account	for	small	groups	that	provide	similar	strength	of	identify	as	strong	institutions	(Searle	2006).	Assumption	number	one	recognizes	that	relationships	between	individuals	only	exist	if	and	only	if	both	parties	acknowledge	the	existence	of	the	relationship.		This	assumption	is	necessary	for	most	social	science	studies.		Assumption	number	two	states	that	sociality	and	social	structures	(the	study	of	social	ontology)	are	worth	studying,	no	matter	the	size,	and	often	times	exhibit	similar	characteristics	of	powerful	social	institutions.		
	 21	
Through	these	assumptions	we	are	able	to	begin	discussion	around	the	modes	of	action,	starting	with	collective	intention,	of	small	group	formation.			Collective	intentionality	“is	the	power	of	minds	to	be	jointly	directed	at	objects,	matters	of	fact,	state	of	affairs,	goals	or	values”	(Schweikard	2013)	to	achieve	group	‘sociality’.	Historically	intentionality	is	associated	with	an	individual	and	it	is	natural	to	assume	that	collective	intention	is	the	summation	of	individual’s	intentions	at	the	aggregate	level.	This	is	not	the	case;	collective	intention	is	irreducible	(Schweikard	2013).	Traditionally	intentionality	is	associated	with	commitment.	The	intention	of	an	individual	morphs	into	the	commitment	of	the	same	individual.	Again,	it	seems	natural	to	assume	that	collective	intention	becomes	the	commitment	of	the	group	as	a	whole	rather	than	the	commitment	of	individuals	to	one	common	commitment.	However,	in	contrast	to	the	irreducible	assumption,	individuals	retain	ownership	of	their	intention	and	commitment,	and	therefore	their	course	of	action	(Schweikard	2013).	The	behavior	observed	because	of	the	collective	intentionality	is	a	result	of	a	group	of	individuals,	individual	collective	intention.			 	Collective	intention,	the	outcome	of	we-intentionality,	acts	through	the	individual	in	several	modes;	shared	intention,	joint	intention,	shared	belief,	collective	acceptance,	and	collective	emotion	(Schweikard	2013).		 1. Shared	intention	removes	intention	from	the	individual	and	places	in	between	individuals	to	achieve	collective	goals.	
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2. Joint	intention	adapts	a	view	of	the	world	that	allows	for	plurality	of	agents.	It	assumes	a	common	ground	to	facilitate	potential	cooperation	between	individuals.	3. Shared	belief,	which	is	activated	before	intention,	is	the	capacity	to	believe	in	a	common	stock	of	knowledge,	or	social	ontology,	paired	with	the	ability	to	influence	information	shared	with	other	individuals	to	have	a	potential	effect	of	intention,	commitment,	and	action.	4. Collective	acceptance	is	knowledge	of	and	therefore	acceptance	of	the	institutions	and	social	norms	present	in	daily	life	that	have	influence	on	our	actions.	5. Collective	emotion	allows	groups	of	people	to	feel	emotions	in	the	aggregate	sense,	removing	the	limitation	of	emotion	from	one	individual	and	allowing	groups	to	feel,	simultaneously	and	effectively	together,	a	singular	emotion.		The	study	of	group	formation	to	form	sociality	is	most	interested	in	shared	intention	and	joint	intention.	For	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	we	will	study	three	mechanisms	of	collective	intentionality,	through	the	mode	of	shared	intention	or	joint	intention:	Michael	Bratman’s	shared	intention	and	planning	agents,	Margaret	Gilbert’s	plural	subject	or	joint	commitment,	and	Raimo	Tuomela’s	shared	ethos	and	we-intentions.	Each	author	is	striving	toward	the	common	goal	“explanations	of	group	phenomena	or	sociality”	but	each	perspective	differs	from	the	others.	For	the	purpose	of	this	paper	I	will	not	be	working	to	choose	the	‘correct’	author,	rather	
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I	will	use	all	three	perspectives	as	alternative	explanations	of	entrepreneurial	behavior.	
Michael	Bratman		Michael	Bratman’s	explanation	for	group	activity	is	referred	to	as	shared	agency	(Bratman	2013).	Bratman	views	planning	structures	as	‘basic	to	our	individual	agency’,	and	uses	the	existence	of	individual	planning	structures	to	develop	a	thesis	for	modest	sociality	via	intentionality.	Planning	structure	are	the	internal	forces	in	place	to	execute	plans	of	action	(Bratman	2013,	p.	51).	By	using	the	planning	structure	Bratman	develops	the	sufficient	conditions	of	intentionality	of	sociality,	while	keeping	the	unit	of	study	focused	on	the	individual.		According	to	Bratman,	individuals	in	the	social	group	must	follow	six	axioms	and	a	dependency	principal	(assuming	agents	A	and	B	have	a	shared	intention	to	do	R	if	and	only	if):			 1. 	Intentions	on	the	part	of	each	in	favor	of	activity	R	(intentions	concerning	the	joint	activity)	2. 	Agent	A	knows	that	agent	B	has	the	intention	to	R	(and	vice	versa)	(Interlocking	intentions)	3. Both	have	intentions	in	favor	of	meshing	sub	plans	to	achieve	R	(Intended	and	actual	mutual	responsiveness	and	mesh)	4. 	Belief	about	the	joint	efficacy	of	the	relevant	intentions		5. 	Belief	about	interpersonal	intention	(Interdependence	of	intentions)	6. 	(Dependency	Principal)	Agent	A	continues	to	intend	to	R	if	and	only	if	agent	B	continues	to	intend	to	R	(and	vice	versa)	
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7. Common	knowledge	of	1	-5	and	dependency	principal.		(Bratman	2015,	p.	85	-	86)	8. The	connection	between	the	shared	intention	and	the	joint	action	involves	public	mutual	responsiveness	in	sub-intentions	and	action	that	tracks	the	end	intended	by	each	of	the	joint	activity	by	way	of	the	intentions	of	each	in	favor	of	the	joint	activity.		(The	Basic	Thesis)		I	will	review	six	points	of	his	thesis;	planning	theory	of	individual	agency,	intentions	concerning	the	joint	activity,	interlocking	intentions,	creation	of	master	plan,	interdependence	of	intentions,	and	intended	and	actual	mutual	responsiveness	and	meshing.			Intentions	of	individuals	are	plan	states	that	guide,	coordinate,	and	organize	thought	and	action	to	accomplish	goals	across	time	as	well	as	at	a	point	in	time.		According	to	Bratman’s	planning	theory,	these	intentions	are	embedded	in	the	planning	that	is	central	to		“internally	organized	temporally	extended	agency”	of	individuals	(Bratman	2014).		Such	agency	is	present	at	all	times.		These	intentions	are	subject	to	adherence	of	the	norms	of	intentional	rationality	consistency	(internally	consistent	and	consistent	with	one’s	belief),	agglomeration	(the	sum	of	the	parts	is	equal	to	the	whole),	means-end	coherence	(intentions	working	toward	a	goal	and	demand	an	outcome),	and	stability	(stability	over	time)	(Bratman	2014,	p.	15).	These	norms	provide	a	standard	explanation	of	how	the	plan	states	(or	intentions)	play	out	in	
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planning	agency	and	provide	a	measure	of	significance	of	the	force	present	in	the	existence	of	norms.				For	a	group	to	exhibit	sociality	it	must	first	share	an	intention,	which	qualifies	under	plan	states,	from	the	listed	norms	above.	Bratman,	determines	that	(because	of	the	planning	theory)	each	individual	can	and	will	choose	an	activity,	of	which	all	group	members	agree	upon.	The	plan	state	then	morphs	from	the	individual	intending	that	they	go	alone	to	the	group	intending	that	they	go	together	(Bratman	2014,	p.	43).			It	is	an	important	nuance	for	the	defense	of	joint	activity	that	the	individuals	together	intend	that	they	X	instead	of	the	individuals	together	intending	to	X.		It	is	here	that	each	individual	can	‘count’	on	joint	action	and	‘need	not	anticipate	experiencing,	from	the	perspective	of	he	who	is	acting,	our	X-ing”	(Bratman	2014	p	64).	For	this,	and	ultimately	planning	theory,	to	hold	true	we	must	assume	that	all	of	the	participants	agree	upon	the	activity	and	the	outcome	of	that	activity.			For	intentions	to	be	interlocking	the	individual	intentions	must	be	connected	to	the	joint	activity	(agreed	upon	in	number	one	listed	above),	showing	a	semantic	interconnection	between	intentions	in	favor	of	the	joint	activity.	For	intentions	to	be	interlocking	each	individual’s	intention	must	include	references	to	the	intention	of	other	individuals	in	the	group	and	the	role	of	their	intention	in	the	joint	action	and	vice	versa	(Bratman	2014,	p	50).	However,	it	cannot	be	forgotten	that	the	intention	itself	is	the	intention	of	an	individual,	and	therefore	the	nature	of	the	intention	is	itself	reflexive	in	that	the	individual	intention	is	for	the	individual	to	meet	their	own	
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plan	for	themselves	(Bratman	2015,	p.	52).	The	interlocking	and	reflexive	property	is	contained	in	“I	intend	that	we	X	and	you	intend	that	we	X”.			The	creation	of	a	‘master	plan’	(Although	Bratman	does	not	refer	to	a	‘master	plan’	I	believe	it	helps	illustrate	his	intended	description	for	meshing	of	sub-plans)	through	the	‘meshing’	together	of	individual	sub-plans	is	necessary	to	achieve	the	intended	joint	activity.	All	the	sub-plans	together	must	‘successfully	execute’	the	joint	action	of	the	individuals	in	order	for	the	intended	meshing	to	be	achieved	(Bratman	2015	p.	53).		The	construction	of	sociality	via	a	master	plan	for	the	means	of	group	action	“can	ensure	that	each	is	committed	to,	and	so	appropriately	responsive	to,	the	consistent,	coherent,	and	effective	interweaving	of	the	planning	agency	of	one	another	in	a	way	that	tracks	the	intended	joint	action”	(Bratman	2015	p.	53	–	54).			Interdependent	intentions	are	important	because	it	is	necessary	for	individuals	to	believe	that	their	personal	intention	can	determine	whether	or	not	the	joint	action	occurs.	However	if	I	believe	that	we	can	achieve	the	joint	action	on	my	own	accord	(within	the	master	plan)	and	you	believe	that	we	can	achieve	the	joint	action	on	your	own	accord,	we	negate	each	other.	Instead	we	must	assume	that	there	is	interdependence	between	the	individual	actor’s	intentions.	Interdependence	binds	each	intention	of	the	individual	together	so	that	each	individual	knows	whether	the	other	continues	to	intend	and	if	they	have	the	ability	to	adjust	the	sub-plan	to	achieve	the	joint	action	(Bratman	2014	p.	71).				
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The	outcome	of	Bratman’s	basic	thesis	is	modest	sociality	–	or	group	agency	by	individuals	working	with	others	to	achieve	individual	goals.	This	is	important	for	the	overall	goal	of	this	thesis,	but	will	be	addressed	more	explicitly	in	the	next	section	of	this	chapter.	Bratman’s	thesis	does	provide	a	strong	central	role	for	the	intentions	of	the	individuals,	which	keeps	a	hybrid	theoretical	approach	to	group	agency.	Bratman	allows	for	individuals	to	share	intentions,	create	a	plan	and	policies	(without	convergence	in	beliefs),	and	complete	a	joint	action	(Bratman	2014,	p.	156).		
Margaret	Gilbert	 	Margaret	Gilbert’s	joint	intention	of	groups	is	explained	as	a	new	relational	definition	of	groups.	Gilbert	proposes	a	plural	subject	approach,	defining	intention	as	part	of	a	new	body	of	people	that	creates	a	single	entity,	where	all	intentions	are	shared	and	then	acted	upon	by	the	group	(Gilbert	2014).	Contrary	to	Bratman,	Gilbert’s	approach	is	non-reductive;	the	intentions	are	more	representative	of	the	group	as	a	whole.	However,	it	could	be	considered	reductionist	thinking	because	of	the	inability	to	allow	the	emergence	of	we-intentions.	(This	is	an	important	aspect	to	the	modeling	of	entrepreneurial	group	formation).		Gilbert	does	share	the	use	of	‘shared	intention’	with	Bratman.	Gilbert,	contrary	to	Bratman,	allows	shared	intention	to	simply	be	present	when	‘we’	is	used	to	explain	who	is	to	do	an	activity,	“we	intend	to	A”.	Gilbert,	using	a	plural	subject	approach,	proposes	connection	via	prior	commitment,	to	drive	intention	(we-intentionality).	This	commitment	or	mutual	obligation	is	the	glue	that	holds	together	the	plural	subjects	via	shared	intention,	the	commitment	is	adequate	in	the	presence	of	three	criteria:	disjunction,	
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concurrence,	and	obligation.	It	is	important	to	note	that	Gilbert	requires	a	plural	subject	approach,	removing	emphasis	from	the	individuals	and	placing	it	on	group	(Gilbert	2009).			The	disjunction	criterion	suggests	that	personal	intentions	are	not	necessary	for	the	existence	of	shared	intention.	Gilbert	presents	her	argument	to	create	“individually	necessary	and	jointly	sufficient	conditions”	for	shared	intention.	In	the	case	of	the	disjunction	criterion	she	suggests	that,	unlike	Bratman,	shared	intention	can	be	present	between	individuals	in	the	presence	of	only	shared	intention	at	the	aggregate	level,	and	not	at	the	personal	level.	Gilbert	states,	“When	two	or	more	people	share	an	intention,	none	of	them	need	have	a	personal	contributory	intention”	(Gilbert	2009,	p.	171).		Gilbert	argues	that	when	shared	intention	is	defended	on	the	accounts	of	correlative	personal	intentions	it	is	does	not	meet	the	necessary	condition	of	shared	intention,	although	it	could	prove	to	be	sufficient.	Unfortunately,	the	sufficiency	of	personal	intentions	creates	hindrance	in	the	creation	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	of	shared	intention.			The	concurrence	condition	supersedes	the	sufficiency	of	correlative	personal	intentions	in	shared	intention,	requiring	concurrence	of	all	parties	for	a	change	in	the	shared	intention	of	the	group.	All	of	Gilbert’s	work	assumes	the	“we”	are	doing	X;	therefore	the	concurrence	condition	speaks	to	the	ability	of	the	shared	intention	to	survive	the	action	of	individuals	and	come	to	fruition.	The	concurrence	condition	states	that	when	individuals	are	interested	in	changing	the	shared	intention	all	
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parties	must	agree	to	the	change,	“absent	special	background	understandings”.	Gilbert	adds	a	qualifier	(special	backgrounds)	to	the	concurrence	condition,	allowing	for	the	existence	of	prior	agreements	to	the	shared	intention	that	could	ultimately	change	the	shared	intention	in	the	middle	of	the	execution.	The	concurrence	condition	provides	partial	framework	to	release	personal	intention	from	the	sufficiency	of	shared	intention	because	of	the	inability	to	simply	release	oneself	from	the	shared	intention	without	the	concurrence	of	the	other	members	involved	in	the	‘we’	action	(Gilbert	2009	p	174).		What	if	members	of	the	group	change	the	plans	and	one	member	disagrees	and	rejects	the	shared	intention?	The	obligation	criterion	of	shared	intention	requires	that	each	member	is	“obligated	to	each	to	act	as	appropriate	to	the	shared	intention	in	conjunction	with	the	rest”	(Gilbert	2009	p.	175).		Gilbert	discusses	the	‘obligation’	and	the	requirement	of	that	obligation;	this	paper	is	not	concerned	with	the	argument	of	obligation	rather	only	the	implication.	Gilbert	concludes	that:		
“…One	who	has	a	right	to	someone’s	future	action	already	owns	that	action	in	
some	intuitive	sense	of	“own”.	Until	the	action	is	performed	he	is	owed	that	
action	by	the	person	concerned,	thus	being	in	a	position	to	demand	it	of	him	
prior	to	its	being	performed	and	to	rebuke	him	if	it	is	not	performed.	If	it	is	
performed,	it	has	finally	come	into	the	possession	of	the	right-holder,	in	the	only	
way	that	it	can.”	(Gilbert	2009	p.	176).			
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The	obligation	criterion,	Gilbert	argues,	further	explains	the	sufficiency	of	correlative	personal	intentions	for	shared	intention.			Gilbert’s	defense	of	shared	intention	concludes	with	an	explanation	of	joint	commitment,	in	the	presence	of	plural	subjects.	Gilbert	suggests	that	shared	intention	is	not	the	sum	of	individual	intention,	rather	“members	of	some	population	P	share	an	intention	to	do	A	if	and	only	if	they	are	jointly	committed	to	intend	as	a	body	to	do	A”.	It	is	important	to	understand	the	nuance	of	‘jointly	committed’,	as	it	is	the	differentiation	of	Gilbert’s	theory	and	other	philosophers	of	social	ontology.	For	Gilbert,	commitment	does	not	occur	until	common	knowledge	is	held	within	the	group	and	all	members	agree.	Each	member	may	be	ready	for	such	a	commitment	but	individual	commitment	is	never	present,	rather	only	joint	commitment.	The	commitment	of	the	individual	to	the	joint	action	must	occur	prior	to	the	shared	intention	(Gilbert	2009).		
Raimo	Tuomela		 	Bratman	and	Gilbert	could	not	find	room	for	both	the	individual’s	intention	and	the	group’s	intention	inside	a	social	group.		However,	Raimo	Tuomela	justifies	group	action	through	the	view	of	both	the	individual’s	intentionality	and	the	group’s	intentionality.	Tuomela	presents	‘we-mode’	and	‘I-mode’	collective	intentionality	in	
Social	Ontology.		We-mode	and	I-mode	are	presented	as	two	different	modes	to	achieve	group	action,	although	both	modes	produce	a	different	type	of	working	group,	using	different	motivations	and	intentions.	I	will	present	both	We-mode	and	
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I-mode	for	reason	of	comparison.	However,	I	will	only	focus	on	we-mode	for	the	purpose	of	application	in	entrepreneurial	group	formation	modeling.			 	The	type	of	intention	determines	“the	function	roles	in	thinking	and	acting	in	virtue	of	their	different	satisfaction	conditions,	which	also	entail	different	commitments	and	action	recommendations”	(Tuomela	2013,	p.	70).	Tuomela	has	identified	three	types	of	I	motivated	intentions:	I-mode	intention	(IMI),	Private	I-Mode	Intention	(PIMI),	&	Pro-group	I-mode	(PROGIMI).			
“	(PIMI)	Agent	A	has	the	intention	that	P	in	the	purely	private	I-mode	if	and	
only	if	A	is	privately	committed	to	satisfying	P	(or	participating	in	the	
satisfaction	of	P)	and	he	intends	to	satisfy	if	only	for	himself	qua	private	person.		
	
	(IMI)	Agent	A	has	the	intention	that	P	in	the	I-mode	if	and	only	if	A	is	privately	
committed	to	satisfying	P	(or	participating	in	the	satisfaction	of	P)	and	he	
intends	to	satisfy	P	(or	participate	in	its	satisfaction)	at	least	in	part	for	himself	
qua	private	person	(rather	than	qua	group	members).		
	
(PROGIMI)	Agent	A	has	the	intention	that	P	in	the	pro-group	I	–mode	in	group	
g	if	and	only	if	A	is	functioning	qua	member	of	g	(in	a	weak	sense),	is	privately	
committed	to	participating	in	the	satisfaction	of	P	and	intends	to	do	it	in	part	
for	(the	members	of)	group	g	but	in	part	for	himself	qua	private	person.	“	
(Tuomela	2013	p.70).	
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	Private	I-mode	intention	(PIMI)	has	no	need	to	be	discussed	for	the	purpose	of	group	agency	and	entrepreneurial	groups.		I-mode	intention	(IMI)	and	Pro-group	I-mode	intention	(PROGIMI)	are	both	means	to	group	formation,	although	both	entirely	different	motivations	than	present	in	we-mode	intentions.	IMI	facilitates	group	action	in	where	the	members	of	the	group	are	only	acting	on	behalf	of	their	individual	interest,	although	other	members	may	benefit	from	the	action	of	the	intention.	However,	PROGIMI	describes	a	person,	acting	as	an	individual	(not	with	individual	goals	only),	to	achieve	a	satisfaction	that	is	desired	jointly	by	group	members.	The	group	is	not	required	to	have	agency,	or	a	joint-intention	and	the	individual	may	act	alone	to	achieve	the	satisfaction	that	is	desired	jointly	by	the	group	members.		It	seems	reasonable	that	because	of	the	lack	of	commitment	from	the	group	that	the	individual	must	be	motivated	enough	to	achieve	the	intention	for	only	the	good	of	the	individual,	therefore	it	stays	an	“I-mode”	mechanism.	We-mode	must	have	a	joint-intention	on	behalf	of	all	members	in	the	group.		Tuomela	as	describes	I-mode	compared	to	we-mode,	“We-thinking	involves	the	notion	of	group	viewed	from	the	“inside”,	from	its	members’	point	of	view,	as	a	“we”	for	them.”	(Tuomela	2013,	p.	23).			To	thoroughly	present	we-mode	I	will	step	through	with	commentary	for	each	of	the	10	qualifiers	of	we-mode	intention,	drawing	comparisons	to	I-mode	intention	and	the	implications	of	group	formation	as	related	directly	to	the	specific	we-mode	qualifier.	Tuomela’s	unique	theories	resulting	from	the	below	listed	qualifiers	are	
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group	reason,	collectivity,	and	collective	commitment	serving	to	unify	the	group	around	“constitutive	goals,	values,	and	purposes	to	which	the	group	life	is	dedicated”	also	known	as	shared	ethos	(Tuomela	2013,	p	15).				 1. Intentional	action	requires	intention	toward	a	relevant	action	–	presently	the	action	is	regarded	as	a	goal,	for	simplicity’s	sake.		2. A	group	agent	g	intends	to	achieve	a	goal	if	and	only	if	its	members	(at	least	the	operative	ones)	intend	jointly,	as	a	group,	to	achieve	it.		3. Intention	involves	at	least	instrumental	commitment.		4. If	group	agent	g	is	committed	to	an	action-goal	X,	its	members	A1,…,	Am	must	be	collectively	committed	to	it	as	a	group	as	well	as	to	their	part	performances.	5. Group	action	X	here	requires	the	members’	A1,…,	Am		participation	in	X	in	terms	of	their	respective	part	actions	X1,…,	Xm	,	and	it	is	here	(simplifying)	assumed	that	the	latter	either	factually	bring	about	or	conceptually	constitute	X.	(Analysis	of	group	action	in	terms	of	members’	actions;	recall	(2).)	6. If	the	members	of	g	have	intentionally	satisfied	their	joint	intention	by	performing	X	as	a	group,	they	have	acted	for	a	group	reason	(viz.,	a	group	reason	for	the	members’	part	performance),	the	reason	here	being	group	agents	g’s	having	the	intention	to	bring	about	X	or	a	further	goal	to	which	the	members’	bringing	about	X	contributes.		
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7. If	the	members	collectively	act	for	a	group	reason	as	a	group,	they	necessarily	satisfy	the	collectivity	condition	with	respect	to	X	and	its	parts:	Necessarily	due	to	acting	as	a	group,	if	the	group	reason	is	satisfied	(fulfilled)	for	any	one	of	them,	it	is	satisfied	(fulfilled)	for	all	of	them	and	the	group.	8. Group	acts	intentionally	as	a	group	to	bring	about	X.	(Categorical	premise	instantiating	the	antecedent	of	(6)	and	(7).)	9. The	members	of	A	act	intentionally	as	a	group	for	that	group	reason,	being	collectively	committed	to	doing	so,	and	satisfying	the	collectivity	condition	(Form	(2)	–	(8).)	10. The	members	of	A	acted	cooperatively	in	the	we-mode	(From	(9)	and	the	three	central	criteria	of	the	we-mode	(viz.,	the	group	reason,	collectivity,	and	collective	commitment	criteria.)	(Tuomela	2013	p.	35	–	36)		An	intentional	agent	can	only	conduct	the	intentional	action.	Intentional	agents	have	representational	mental	states,	emotions,	feelings,	understand	normativity,	and	are	capable	of	obeying	norms.	Their	individual	agency	provides	the	framework	for	each	individual	to	perform	intentional	action,	or	action	for	a	reason	for	their	own	behalf	(Tuomela	2013	p.	21)	Qualifier	number	one	places	importance	of	both	intentional	action	and	therefore	the	agents	being	intentional	agents.	Any	individual	working	to	accomplish	any	action,	both	individual	and	group	action	is	under	the	first	qualifier.	However	in	statement	number	two	above	the	group	members	are	incorporated	into	the	intentional	action.	This	does	not	distinguish	between	I-mode	and	we-mode	group	action,	rather	individual	action	from	group	action.	Qualifier	number	three	
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again	does	not	provide	reason	for	separation	from	we-mode	or	I-mode	group	action;	instead	it	places	a	requirement	for	commitment	to	be	present	when	achieving	any	type	of	intention.	Qualifier	number	four	begins	the	separation	of	we-mode	and	I-mode.			As	described	above	the	largest	difference	in	Pro-Group	I-Mode	(PROGIMI)	and	we-mode	is	the	group	membership.	An	individual	functioning	in	PROGIMI	is	acting	as	a	private	person,	where	we-moders	employ	we-thinking	and	we-reasoning	to	achieve	collectivity.	Collectivity	is	a	condition	of	we-mode	presented	by	Tuomela.	It	makes	‘togetherness’	of	a	group	(not	necessarily	group	membership	but	rather	knowledge	and	acceptance	of	group	members)	a	necessary	condition	for	the	presence	of	we-mode	group	action.	Individuals	must	complete	their	responsible	action	to	achieve	to	group	action	to	continue	to	qualifier	number	five.	If	the	action	is	complete	the	remaining	qualifiers	are	in	place	and	therefore	the	existence	of	collectivity.	It	is	important	to	note	that	collectivity,	according	to	Tuomela,	only	requires	the	appropriate	actions	to	be	completed	by	group	members.	In	addition	to	collectivity	Tuomela	requires	that	two	other	criteria:	group	reason	and	collective	commitment	culminating	in	‘shared	ethos’	(Tuomela	2013).			Tuomela	is	concerned	by	the	motivating	factors	to	achieve	group	action.	He	places	much	time	explaining	the	nuances	of	how	individuals	can	be	motivated	to	work	together.	His	second	criteria	continues	much	like	collectivity	and	is	concerned	with	the	motivation	of	the	individual	on	behalf	of	the	group,	“We-mode	action	is	based	on	
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a	group	reason	and	is	thus	performed	for	the	reason	of	promoting	the	group’s	interest.”	(Tuomela	2013,	p.38).	Group	reason	or	group	motives	is	the	driving	force	behind	the	desired	action.	When	considering	the	10	we-mode	qualifiers	listed	above	group	reason	was	in	place	at	number	two.	Again,	to	participate	in	group-reason,	group	membership	in	not	a	necessary	condition	(this	time	Tuomela	suggests	that	“wholehearted	identification”	via	group	membership	shows	“genuine”	commitment	to	we-mode)	(Tuomela	2013,	p.	39).			If	group	reason	motivates	individuals	to	act	together	and	collectivity	embodies	the	desire	to	act	together,	then	collective	commitment	is	the	glue.	Collective	commitment	acts	through	joint-intention.	“Group	members’	joint	intention	to	see	to	it	that	something	(group	ethos	–	the	accumulation	of	group	reason	and	collectivity)	is	or	will	be	the	case	even	on	conceptual	groups	generates	collective	commitment	for	the	member	to	see	to	it	that	‘p’”	(Tuomela	2013,	p.	45).		All	three	criteria	are	concerned	with	the	motivations	on	the	individual	level.	Because	Tuomela	distinguishes	group	action	at	such	a	level	it	is	then	easy	to	determine	whether	individuals	are	action	in	pro-group	I-mode	or	we-mode	to	achieve	group	action.	The	cornerstone	of	we-mode	is	shared	ethos.	Individuals	acting	to	achieve	group	action	without	group	motivation,	commitment,	or	intention	individuals	are	operating	in	I-mode,	however	when	the	strength	of	shared	ethos	is	present	it	provides	the	framework	to	motivate	individuals	act	inside	the	group	reason,	collectivity,	and	collective	commitment.		
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Group	Agency		The	concept	of	group	agency	resembles	we-intentionality,	in	that	both	are	representative	of	a	group	of	people	and	their	interaction.	Group	agency	is	specific	to	the	group	interaction	with	its	environment.	We-intentionality	is	specific	to	the	interaction	of	individuals	that	make	up	the	group.	“The	main	argument	for	employing	the	motion	of	group	agent	(or	that	of	a	group	capable	of	action)	is	that	it	has	indispensable	explanatory,	predictive,	and	descriptive	usefulness	for	theorizing	about	the	social	world,	especially	in	the	case	of	large	groups.	“	(Tuomela	2013,	p.	46).		Although	Tuomela	continues	to	focus	on	the	size	and	group	reason	as	further	reason	for	studying	group	agency	he	communicates	a	point	that	is	important	for	the	study	of	group	agency	for	the	small	entrepreneurial	group	–	understanding	how	small	entrepreneurial	groups	interact	with	their	environment	provides	explanatory,	predictive,	and	descriptive	usefulness	in	the	study	of	entrepreneurship.			Several	different	doctrines	prevail	for	the	conditions	of	agency.	I	will	focus	on	one	thesis	presented	by	Christian	List	and	Philip	Pettit	in	Group	Agency:	The	possibility,	
design,	and	status	of	corporate	agents.	List	and	Pettit	present	three	features	of	an	agent:			 1. (The	agent)	has	representational	states	that	depict	how	things	are	in	the	environment	2. (The	agent)	has	motivational	states	that	specify	how	it	requires	things	to	be	in	the	environment	
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3. (The	agent)	has	the	capacity	to	process	its	representational	and	motivational	states,	leading	it	to	intervene	suitably	in	the	environment	whenever	that	environment	fails	to	match	a	motivation	specification	(List	2011	p.	20	-	22)		Representational	and	motivational	states	are,	or	intentional	states,	are	arrangements	in	the	personality	of	the	individual	that	interact	with	other	states	to	produce	action.		The	representational	states	depict	the	world	and	the	motivational	states	motivate	action.	List	and	Pettit	are	not	concerned	with	the	physical	nature	of	such	states,	only	that	the	state	initiates	the	action	of	the	agent.	It	is	the	combination	of	both	the	representation	of	the	environment	perceived	by	the	agent	and	the	motivation	of	agent	to	change	the	environment	that	initiates	action	by	the	agent	(List	2011,	p.	20	–	22).			A	simple	analogy	of	agency	as	a	robot	provides	an	example	lacking	complexity.	A	robot	uses	its	representative	states	to	observe	an	environment	and	motivated	by	one	driving	force	changes	its	environment	based	on	its	motivational	state.	The	robot	in	this	scenario	may	observe	many	environmental	changes,	however	if	the	change	is	not	‘represented’	within	the	scope	of	the	robots	concern	no	action	will	be	taken.	However,	when	the	same	three	conditions	of	agency	are	applied	to	complex	human	beings	an	enhanced	scope	is	required.	Consider	the	inverse	approach	to	determining	the	intentional	states	of	an	agent.	In	the	robot	example	an	observer	would	be	able	to	identify	both	the	representational	and	motivational	states	of	the	robots	through	consideration	of	what	the	cues	for	the	robot	to	preform	action	are.	
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Add	multiple	intentional	states	and	a	diverse	environment;	the	identification	of	intentional	states	then	becomes	difficult	to	the	observer	(List	2011,	p	23).		Because	the	environment	and	motivations	of	entrepreneurial	projects	are	so	complex	for	the	purpose	of	modeling	group	agency	via	collective	intentional	it	is	critical	to	have	a	strong	understanding	the	ontology	in	the	background.			List	and	Pettit	go	on	to	defend	group	agency	within	their	own	framework	of	joint-intentionality.	The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	explore	different	modes	of	we-intentionality,	or	different	ontological	perspectives.	I	will	take	the	necessary	condition	of	we-intentionality	to	group	agency	as	proposed	by	List	and	Pettit	and	test	the	three	different	mechanisms	(Bratman,	Gilbert,	and	Tuomela)	proposed	above.	Group	agency	is	the	fulfillment	of	the	three	necessary	conditions,	proposed	above	for	individual	agency,	only	applied	to	a	group	that	exhibits	we-intentionality	and	therefore	individuals	with	joint	intention	to	accomplish	specific	goals.			In	addition	to	List	and	Pettit,	John	Searle	has	an	ontological	approach	to	group	agency.	Searle	acknowledges	the	individual	as	methodological	individualism	does,	and	makes	the	assumption,	as	made	by	many	social	scientists,	of	the	existence	of	a	collective	world	and	all	influences	of	the	collective	world	(social	norms,	social	structures,	etc.)	to	effect	and	be	a	part	of	the	individual.	Therefore	Searle	argues	that	we-intentions	are	a	sort	of	social	structure	in	place	to	morph	and	influence	I-intention.	Natalie	Gold	describes	Searle’s	approach	to	collective	intentions	with	I-intentions	being	the	derivative	form	of	we-intentions	with	the	thought	process	as	
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follows,	“We	intend	to	we-intention	by	me	I-intention.	“	(Searle	2006).	This	method	of	describing	group	actions	separates	we-intentions	from	I-intentions	and	requires	the	unit	of	analysis	be	different	for	both	types	of	intentions	during	the	study	of	group	behavior.	(Searle,	similar	to	List	and	Pettit,	present	a	theory	for	we-intentions,	of	which	we	are	not	concerned.	Searle’s	approach	requires	imposition	from	a	third	party	of	the	implementation	of	we-intentions.	This	paper	is	interested	in	group	formation	that	is	created	from	the	members	and	not	directed	by	a	leader.)		Searle	extends	individual	intentionality	to	a	system	of	multiple	agents	working	under	a	defined	social	norm	to	represent	collective	intentionality,	and	therefore	group	agency.	Searle	confirms	the	need	to	for	collective	intentionality	to	morph	into	group	agency,	although	he	does	not	spend	adequate	time	describing	the	properties	of	agency.	Searle	does	go	on	to	say	“…	Assigns	action	through	powers,	duties,	rights,	and	responsibilities.	Collective	intention	is	achieved	through	the	acceptance	of	status	and	authorization	of	power”…even	in	the	entrepreneurial	group	(Searle	2006).	Searle	requires	obligations,	rights,	and	responsibilities	for	institutions	to	be	recognized,	or	‘sociality’	to	be	recognized,	or	(further	refined)	the	group	agency	of	a	small	entrepreneurial	group	to	come	to	fruition	and	therefore	complete	group	action	(Searle	2006).			 	
Agent-based	Modeling	for	Social	Sciences	In	the	literature	review	above,	I	describe	the	significant	elements	of	the	current	literature	on	social	ontology.	By	taking	a	we-intentionality	approach	to	the	study	of	entrepreneurial	group	formation,	I	adapted	individualism	and	holism	to	a	hybrid	perspective.	That	view	allowed	for	consideration	of	philosophers’	take	on	group	
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formation	to	achieve	group	agency.	To	prove	their	theories	Bratman,	Gilbert,	and	Tuomela	relied	on	thought	experiments	to	prove	the	existence,	necessity,	and	sufficiency	of	all	conditions.	Such	a	method	is	not	sufficient	for	the	study	of	entrepreneurship	in	economics.	Traditional	economic	methods	would	suggest	I	study	entrepreneurial	group	formation	under	econometrics	or	equilibrium	modeling.	However,	because	of	my	hybrid	theoretical	approach	I	am	unable	to	justify	or	support	such	a	methodology.	Instead	I	am	interested	in	using	a	method	of	study	that	allows	the	management	of	individual	behaviors	and	the	observance	of	emergent	group	behavior.	How	can	social	ontology	be	linked	to	the	study	of	collective	entrepreneurship?	Since	group	agency	(action)	is	the	outcome	of	purposeful	group	intentionality,	it	is	necessary	to	have	a	modeling	technique	that	allows	for	the	demonstration	of	the	individual	and	group	mental	states	and	their	resultant	behaviors.	Agent-based	modeling	explicitly	allows	for	the	modeling	of	individual	behaviors	and	the	interactions	between	individuals	(note	in	biology	ABM	is	called	Individual-based	modeling	or	IBM).		Agent-based	modeling	is	a	model	structure	that	first,	allows	individuals	and	the	environment	to	be	given	specific	individual	traits;	second,	allows	the	two	to	interact	while	maintaining	individuality;	and	finally,	allows	the	modeler	to	observe	the	change	of	the	individuals	and	subsequent	emergent	group	behavior.	The	essence	of	the	agent-based	modeling	is	the	ability	for	emergence	of	group	and	system	level	behaviors	from	the	individual’s	interaction	with	the	environment.	This	research	uses	agent-based	modeling	(ABM)	to	illustrate	the	relationship	between	individuals,	
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we-intentionality,	and	group	agency	in	the	founding	of	collective	entrepreneurial	ventures	(i.e.	the	accounts	of	Bratman,	Gilbert,	and	Tuomela).	The	use	of	ABM	allows	me	to	examine	the	outcomes	of	alternative	decision-making	rules	for	individuals	(multiple	philosophers	within	one	model)	and	alternative	interaction	behaviors	among	individuals	(the	progression	of	group	agency	within	an	individual).	Agent-based	Modeling	allows	for	a	model	simulation	of	group	behavior	and	emergent	phenomena	while	accounting	for	the	differences	in	individuals,	local	interactions,	and	adaptive	behavior	of	the	individuals.		The	appeal	for	Agent-based	modeling	in	the	study	of	group	entrepreneurship	comes	from	the	ability	to	account	for	local	interactions	and	monitor	group	behavior	simultaneously.	
	This	section	of	the	literature	review	will	present	the	use	of	agent-based	modeling	for	the	study	of	collective	entrepreneurship.	This	section	will	maintain	a	literature	review	approach	and	not	divulge	the	details	of	the	model	itself.	
An	Agent-based	Modeling	(ABM)	Approach	to	Collective	Entrepreneurship		
	
“Agent-based	models	are	computational	representations	of	autonomous	agents	who	
interact	with	each	other	at	a	micro	level	leading	to	broader-level	patterns”	(Poteete	et	
al.	2011,	p;	171).			The	use	of	Agent-based	modeling	(ABM)	in	the	study	of	social	ontology	is	in	its	infancy.	ABM	is	widely	used	in	ecology	today	(often	referred	to	as	Individual-based	modeling,	IBM).	Similar	logic	used	for	the	justification	of	ABMs	in	ecology	can	be	used	for	ABMs	in	social	ontology.		
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“…In	ecology,	the	individuals	are	not	atoms	but	living	organisms.	Individual	
organisms	have	properties	an	atom	does	not	have.	Individuals	grow	and	
develop,	changing	in	many	ways	over	their	life	cycle.	Individuals	reproduce	and	
die,	typically	persisting	for	much	less	time	that	the	systems	to	which	they	
belong.	Because	individuals	need	resources,	they	modify	their	environment,	
Individuals	differ	from	each	other,	even	within	the	same	species,	and	age,	so	
each	interacts	with	its	environment	in	unique	ways.	Most	important,	
individuals	are	adaptive:	all	that	an	individual	does	–	grow,	develop,	acquire	
resources,	reproduce,	interact	–	depends	on	its	internal	and	external	
environments.	Individuals	organisms	are	adaptive	because,	in	contrast	to	
atoms,	organisms	have	an	objective,	which	is	the	great	master	plan	of	life:	they	
must	seek	fitness,	that	is,	attempt	to	pass	their	genes	on	to	future	generations.	
As	products	of	evolution,	individuals	have	traits	allowing	them	to	adapt	to	
changes	in	themselves	and	their	environment	in	ways	that	increase	fitness.”	
(Grimm	&	Railsback,	2005	p.	3)			Social	ontologists	agree	that	individuals	are	different,	able	to	grow	and	develop,	capable	of	modifying	their	environment,	and	adaptive.	Indeed,	ecology	and	ontology	are	different	perspectives	on	behavior.	I	am	not	here	to	compare	the	two	--	explicitly	how	fitness	of	an	individual	in	a	social	group	compares	to	the	fitness	of	animals.	However,	without	little	explanation	it	is	evident	that	an	individual	(in	a	social	sense)	is	more	concerned	with	their	livelihood	than	the	livelihood	of	the	group	(Grimm	&	
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Railsback	2005).	Therefore,	the	individual	will	be	adapting,	sensing,	and	changing	to	the	environment	it	is	presented,	with	the	intention	of	success	–	whether	it	be	the	success	for	the	good	of	the	individual	alone	of	the	success	of	the	individual	inside	a	social	group.		In	order	to	monitor	both	the	status	of	the	individual	and	the	existence	of	groups	I	need	a	research	method	that	can	monitor	the	‘interrelations	between	individual	traits	and	system	dynamics’	(Grimm	&	Railsback	2005,	p.	4).		ABMs	are	used	when	there	is	differences	in	individuals,	local	interactions	are	present,	emergent	qualities	are	expected,	and	individuals	exercise	their	ability	to	make	adaptive	decisions	(DeAngelis	2005).	The	system	dynamics	of	concern	during	group	formation	is	the	group	mental	state	and	resultant	behavior	(group	agency).	The	achievement	of	group	agency	is	the	result	of	the	formation	of	a	group.	Once	agency	is	formed	the	model	is	over,	a	simple	counting	of	groups	is	sufficient	to	measure	the	activity	that	occurred.	However,	because	of	ABM	we	have	an	additional	lever	that	allows	the	monitoring	of	the	formation	process	for	each	individual.	Although	the	resultant	behavior	is	the	trigger	of	completion	of	the	purpose	of	this	study,	without	the	ability	to	analysis	the	individuals	the	research	is	lacking.	This	study	then	is	able	to	defend	the	four	qualifiers	for	ABM	(differences	in	individuals,	local	interactions,	emergent	qualities,	and	individual	exercising	their	ability	to	make	adaptive	decisions).	Social	ontology	supports	that	individuals	are	different.	Local	interactions	are	present	of	individuals	are	present	during	the	group	formation	process.	Emergent	qualities	are	expected	to	arise	from	group	agency.		Individuals	
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exercise	their	ability	to	make	adaptive	decisions	to	determine	their	status	of	group	agency.			 	
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The	Model		It	is	the	purpose	of	this	section	to	describe	the	conceptual	frameworks	for	creation	of,	and	detail	the	logic	behind,	four	working	models;	each	designed	to	increase	understanding	of	the	social	ontology	present	in	small	entrepreneurial	group	formation.	This	section	is	not	the	ODD	(a	strict	protocol	required	for	Agent-based	Modeling),	but	rather	supplemental	information	to	make	clear	the	ability	Agent-based	modeling	has	to	test	and	analyze	social	ontological	puzzles.	First,	I	will	step	through	each	model’s	logic,	citing	the	literature	review.	Second,	I	will	elaborate	on	the	two	mechanisms	for	group	formation	that	dominate:	individual	based	and	group	based,	and	the	impact	that	has	on	modeling.	Finally,	I	will	emphasize	the	unique	perspective	created	by	viewing	social	ontology	through	Agent-based	modeling.	
Model	Logic	The	models	presented	represent	an	ontological	approach	to	better	understanding	entrepreneurial	groups.	Although	Bratman,	Gilbert,	and	Tuomela	give	little	concern	to	the	type	of	people	acting	in	group	formation,	the	study	of	entrepreneurial	groups	places	great	weight	on	this	point.	The	members	of	an	entrepreneurial	group	cannot	be	homophilous	for	the	success	of	the	group,	rather	it	is	important	to	have	different	roles	and	attributes	represented.	Fritz	Redlich	separates	active	roles	in	entrepreneurial	groups	into	the	innovator,	capitalist,	and	manager.	The	innovator,	in	the	most	traditional	sense,	is	the	‘entrepreneur’	or	the	‘dreamer’.	The	capitalist,	brings	the	money	and	know-how	to	finance	the	project.	The	manager	does	all	the	hard	dirty	work	of	details	to	bring	to	fruition	the	dreamers	dreams	(Redlich	1951).	In	some	real-life	circumstances	this	approach	will	not	fit,	roles	may	be	combined	
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into	one	person	and	additional	roles	filled	through	other	people.	However,	the	exercise	is	more	for	the	benefit	of	adding	diversity	to	the	required	mix	of	an	entrepreneurial	group,	not	the	roles	they	are	considered	to	be	for	this	study.			Although,	the	formation	mechanism	proposed	by	each	social	ontologist	is	distinctly	different,	the	inner	workings	of	the	codes	operate	quite	similarly.			When	group	formation	is	achieved	it	is	not	of	model	importance	as	to	whether	an	individual	lead	the	group	design	or	the	group	presence	forced	the	group	design,	and	therefore	each	model	operates	quite	similarly.	I	mention	these	specifics	as	a	pre-cursor	to	the	presentation	of	the	model	to	provide	the	correct	lenses	to	view	the	model	logic.	
Bratman	Bratman	views	planning	structures	as	‘basic	to	our	individual	agency’,	and	uses	the	existence	of	individual	planning	structures	to	develop	a	thesis	for	modest	sociality	via	intentionality.	Planning	structure	are	the	internal	forces	in	place	to	execute	plans	of	action	(Bratman	2013,	p.	51).	According	to	Bratman,	individuals	in	the	social	group	must	follow	six	axioms	and	a	dependency	principal	(assuming	agents	A	and	B	have	a	shared	intention	to	do	R	if	and	only	if):			 1. 	Intentions	on	the	part	of	each	in	favor	of	activity	R.	(intentions	concerning	the	joint	activity)	2. 	Agent	A	knows	that	agent	B	has	the	intention	to	R	(and	vice	versa).	(Interlocking	intentions)	
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3. Both	have	intentions	in	favor	of	meshing	sub	plans	to	achieve	R.	(Intended	and	actual	mutual	responsiveness	and	mesh)	4. 	Belief	about	the	joint	efficacy	of	the	relevant	intentions		5. 	Belief	about	interpersonal	intention	(Interdependence	of	intentions)	6. 	(Dependency	Principal)	Agent	A	continues	to	intend	to	R	if	and	only	if	agent	B	continues	to	intend	to	R	(and	vice	versa)	7. Common	knowledge	of	1	-5	and	dependency	principal.		(Bratman	2015,	p.	85	-	86)	8. The	connection	between	the	shared	intention	and	the	joint	action	involves	public	mutual	responsiveness	in	sub-intentions	and	action	that	tracks	the	end	intended	by	each	of	the	joint	activity	by	way	of	the	intentions	of	each	in	favor	of	the	joint	activity.		(The	Basic	Thesis)		For	a	group	to	exhibit	sociality	it	must	first	share	an	intention.	Bratman,	determines	that	(because	of	the	planning	theory)	each	individual	can	and	will	choose	an	activity,	of	which	all	group	members	agree	upon.	The	plan	state	then	morphs	from	the	individual	intending	that	they	go	alone	to	the	group	intending	that	they	go	together	(Bratman	2014,	p	43).	The	creation	of	a	‘master	plan’	through	the	‘meshing’	together	of	individual	sub-plans	is	sufficient	to	achieve	the	intended	joint	activity.	All	the	sub-plans	together	must	‘successfully	execute’	the	joint	action	of	the	individuals	in	order	for	the	intended	meshing	to	be	achieved	(Bratman	2015,	p.	53).	The	outcome	of	Bratman’s	basic	thesis	is	modest	sociality	–	or	group	agency.	In	the	modeling	for	Bratman	group	formation,	formation	begins	when	agents	unite	based	on	intentions,	
	 49	
agents	can	only	link	with	agents	that	are	not	like	them	in	‘entrepreneurial	role’.	If	each	of	the	agents	has	the	same	type	of	intention	then	the	agents	begin	to	‘mesh’	their	sub-plans.	If	the	incorrect	type	of	meshing	occurs	the	group	dissolves.	The	formation	of	the	‘master	plan’	is	the	indication	of	group	agency.		
Gilbert	In	Margaret	Gilbert’s	ontology	of	groups	she	uses	a	plural	subject	approach	to	propose	connection	via	prior	commitment,	to	drive	we-intentionality.	This	commitment	or	mutual	obligation	is	the	glue	that	holds	together	the	plural	subjects	via	shared	intention.	The	commitment	present	is	adequate	in	the	presence	of	three	criteria:	disjunction,	concurrence,	and	obligation	(Gilbert	2009).	The	two	key	factors	in	representing	Gilbert’s	approach	are	commitment	and	intention.	In	Gilbert’s	literature	she	proposes	that	prior	commitment	is	present	first,	before	intention.	It	is	the	obligation	imposed	by	the	commitment	that	forces	concurrence	on	the	intention	to	be	completed.	In	the	modeling	of	Gilbert	group	formation,	formation	begins	when	agents	unite	based	on	prior	commitments	in	place,	agents	can	only	link	with	agents	that	are	not	like	them	(adding	diversity	to	the	entrepreneurial	group).	The	group	then	brings	intention	to	a	consensus.	The	sign	of	intention	then	triggers	group	agency.		
Tuomela	Bratman	and	Gilbert	could	not	find	room	for	both	the	individual’s	intention	and	the	group’s	intention	inside	a	social	group.		However,	Raimo	Tuomela	can	only	justify	group	action	through	the	view	of	both	the	individual’s	intentionality	and	the	group’s	intentionality.	Tuomela’s	unique	theories	resulting	from	the	below	listed	qualifiers	
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are	group	reason,	collectivity,	and	collective	commitment	serving	to	unify	the	group	around	“constitutive	goals,	values,	and	purposes	to	which	the	group	life	is	dedicated”	also	known	as	shared	ethos	(Tuomela	2013,	p	15).				 1. Intentional	action	requires	intention	toward	a	relevant	action	–	presently	the	action	is	regarded	as	a	goal,	for	simplicity’s	sake.		2. A	group	agent	g	intends	to	achieve	a	goal	if	and	only	if	its	members	(at	least	the	operative	ones)	intend	jointly,	as	a	group,	to	achieve	it.		3. Intention	involves	at	least	instrumental	commitment.		4. If	group	agent	g	is	committed	to	an	action-goal	X,	its	members	A1,…,	Am	must	be	collectively	committed	to	it	as	a	group	as	well	as	to	their	part	performances.	5. Group	action	X	here	requires	the	members’	A1,…,	Am		participation	in	X	in	terms	of	their	respective	part	actions	X1,…,	Xm	,	and	it	is	here	(simplifying)	assumed	that	the	latter	either	factually	bring	about	or	conceptually	constitute	X.	(Analysis	of	group	action	in	terms	of	members’	actions;	recall	(2).)	6. If	the	members	of	g	have	intentionally	satisfied	their	joint	intention	by	performing	X	as	a	group,	they	have	acted	for	a	group	reason	(viz.,	a	group	reason	for	the	members’	part	performance),	the	reason	here	being	group	agents	g’s	having	the	intention	to	bring	about	X	or	a	further	goal	to	which	the	members’	bringing	about	X	contributes.		
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7. If	the	members	collectively	act	for	a	group	reason	as	a	group,	they	necessarily	satisfy	the	collectivity	condition	with	respect	to	X	and	its	parts:	Necessarily	due	to	acting	as	a	group,	if	the	group	reason	is	satisfied	(fulfilled)	for	any	one	of	them,	it	is	satisfied	(fulfilled)	for	all	of	them	and	the	group.	8. Group	acts	intentionally	as	a	group	to	bring	about	X.	(Categorical	premise	instantiating	the	antecedent	of	(6)	and	(7).)	9. The	members	of	A	act	intentionally	as	a	group	for	that	group	reason,	being	collectively	committed	to	doing	so,	and	satisfying	the	collectivity	condition	(Form	(2)	–	(8).)	10. The	members	of	A	acted	cooperatively	in	the	we-mode	(From	(9)	and	the	three	central	criteria	of	the	we-mode	(viz.,	the	group	reason,	collectivity,	and	collective	commitment	criteria.)	(Tuomela	2013,	p.	35	–	36)		An	individual’s	agency	provides	the	framework	for	each	individual	to	preform	intentional	action,	or	action	for	a	reason	for	their	own	behalf	(Tuomela	2013,	p.	21)	Tumela	is	concerned	by	the	motivating	factors	to	achieve	group	action.	If	group	reason	motivates	individuals	to	act	together	and	collectivity	embodies	the	desire	to	act	together,	then	collective	commitment	is	the	glue.	Collective	commitment	acts	through	joint-intention.	The	cornerstone	of	we-mode	is	shared	ethos.	Individuals	acting	to	achieve	group	action	without	group	motivation,	commitment,	or	intention	individuals	are	operating	in	I-mode,	however	when	the	strength	of	shared	ethos	is	present	it	provides	the	framework	to	motivate	individuals	act	inside	the	group	reason,	collectivity,	and	collective	commitment.		In	the	modeling	of	Tuomela	group	
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formation,	the	presence	of	we-intention	is	the	driving	trait	that	spurs	group	formation.	Agents	are	only	allowed	to	form	groups	with	agents	that	are	in	different	roles	than	themselves	and	but	share	the	same	ethos,	intention,	and	believe	that	each	member	will	contribute	to	the	success	of	the	share	ethos	(represented	as	belief	in	the	model).		For	Tuomela	it	is	the	existence	of	the	shared	belief	that	the	accumulation	of	all	parameters	will	accomplish	the	we-intention	that	trigger	group	formation.			
Real	World		Each	social	ontologist	makes	underlying	assumptions	about	the	environment	in	which	group	formation	is	occurring.	Therefore	each	perspective	is	tied	to	specific	circumstances	and	it	is	highly	probable	that	depending	on	the	motivating	goal,	perspective	of	the	individual,	and	parameters	of	the	environment	the	type	of	formation	will	differ.	The	motivating	factor	for	Bratman	is	the	presence	of	I-intention	and	for	Gilbert	&	Tuomela	it	is	the	presence	of	we-intention.		However,	the	motivations	that	follow	for	each	perspective	differ	in	order,	execution,	and	formation.	Outside	of	these	factors,	the	model	has	external	influences	that	impact	the	type	of	group	formation	to	occur.		To	complete	the	experimentation	of	how	the	three	models	described	above	interact,	a	model	that	incorporates	all	three	group	formation	methods	was	developed.	This	model	is	a	demonstration	of	how	different	formation	mechanisms	execute	when	present	amongst	each	other.		This	model	is	necessarily	more	complete	then	the	models	of	the	three	individual	accounts.		
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The	power	of	the	agent-based	modeling	tool	is	revealed	through	this	real	world	model	demonstration.	The	real	world	agent-based	model	of	potential	group	formation	structures	is	a	first-of-kind,	regimented	validation	of	the	three	proposed	approaches	(Bratman,	Gilbert,	and	Tuomela)	individuals	use	when	completing	group	formation	to	achieve	group	agency.	Although	the	sophistication	of	each	model,	from	an	ament-based	Modeling	and	NetLogo	perspective	does	not	seem	revolutionary,	the	application	of	such	a	regimented	discipline	to	a	field	that	typically	uses	thought	experiments	is	impactful.	This	approach	allows	for	a	qualitative	analysis	of	the	group	agency	while	systematically	analyzing	the	potential	formation	efforts	of	the	individuals.		
Mechanisms	for	Group	Formation	The	mechanisms	described	by	Bratman,	Gilbert,	and	Tuomela	can	be	summarized	in	two	categories:	1)	individual-based	and	2)	group-based.	Bratman	relies	upon	the	intentions	of	individuals	to	motivate	group	formation.	Gilbert	and	Tuomela	perceive	the	existence	of	we-intention	(or	at	least	the	awareness	of	we-intention)	as	the	beginning	of	the	pathway	to	group	formation.	Each	model	has	an	agent	attribute	that	prompts	the	action	to	search	for	potential	group	members	within	a	specific	search	radius.	Then	agents	access	the	surrounding	environment	in	search	of	potential	group	members	based	on	specific	attributes.	For	each	model	the	order	attributes	are	searched	for	differs,	this	coding	difference	is	the	illustration	for	the	different	social	ontological	views.	For	the	purpose	of	this	section,	I	will	describe	the	motivating	factors	behind	the	programming	of	each	group	formation	category.		
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Individual-Based	For	Michael	Bratman	the	agent	characteristic	that	prompts	modest	sociality	(and	therefore	the	search	process)	is	I-intention	to	achieve	a	specific	action.		All	group	action	is	driven	by	the	individual’s	motivation	via	planning	to	complete	a	task	in	congruence	with	others	that	share	the	same	I-intention.	Bratman	allows	for	individuals	to	share	intentions,	create	a	plan	and	policies	(without	convergence	in	beliefs),	and	complete	a	joint	action	(Bratman	2014	p.	156).		In	this	model	individuals	must	have	share	the	same	intention	and	the	ability	to	mesh	sub-plans.	Bratman	relies	upon	planning	structures	to	achieve	group	formation	and	therefore	it	is	necessary	that	all	potential	group	members	are	willing	and	able	to	mesh	sub-plans	to	achieve	the	agreed	upon	action.	Modest	sociality,	an	equivalent	to	group	agency,	is	Bratman’s	proposed	outcome.		
Group-Based	For	Margaret	Gilbert	the	agent	characteristic	that	prompts	joint	intention	(and	therefore	the	search	process)	is	prior	commitment	with	other	agents.	Gilbert’s	approach	is	non-reductive;	intentions	are	not	motivated	by	the	I-intention	of	the	individual	but	rather	the	shared	intention	present	in	the	prior	commitments.	We-intentions	are	only	formed	after	the	formation	of	the	group	and	consensus	of	the	group	objective	is	reached	within	the	group.	Gilbert	does	share	the	use	of	‘shared	intention’	with	Bratman.		However,	in	the	Gilbert	model	this	is	not	represented	as	qualifier	to	group	formation,	but	rather	the	intention	is	transformed	to	a	shared	intention	in	the	presence	of	prior	commitment.	Although	the	attribute	intention	is	used	all	of	the	models,	each	approach	uses	the	attribute	different.	Gilbert,	contrary	to	Bratman,	allows	shared	intention	to	simply	be	present	when	‘we’	is	used	to	
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explain	who	is	to	do	an	activity,	“we	intend	to	A”.		For	modeling	this	nuance	of	the	attribute	is	not	captured,	rather	the	existence	of	intention	is	screened	for	and	if	present	the	model	continues	to	proceed	in	the	action	of	group	formation	(Gilbert	2009),	relying	that	intentions	will	converge	upon	group	formation.	The	Gilbert	model	is	simplest	of	the	models,	relying	on	the	prior-commitments	to	be	the	connection	for	group	initialization	and	the	motivation	to	agree	upon	a	we-intention	to	achieve	group	agency.			For	Raimo	Tuomela	the	agent	characteristic	that	prompts	we-mode	group	formation	(and	therefore	the	search	process)	is	the	existence	of	we-intention	within	the	individual.	His	second	criteria	is	concerned	with	the	motivation	of	the	individual	on	behalf	of	the	group,	“We-mode	action	is	based	on	a	group	reason	and	is	thus	performed	for	the	reason	of	promoting	the	group’s	interest.”	(Tuomela	2013,	p.38).	Group	reason	is	the	driving	force	behind	the	desired	action	and	illustrated	in	two	attributes	in	the	model.	In	order	for	group	formation	to	occur	the	intention,	the	ethos	(or	group	reason),	and	the	beliefs	(presence	of	collectivity)	of	the	potential	group	members	must	be	the	same	as	the	intention,	ethos,	and	beliefs	of	searching	agent.		The	group	reason	(represented	as	ethos	in	the	model)	is	the	motivation	for	individuals	to	act	together	and	collectivity	(represented	as	belief	in	the	model)	and	therefore	embodies	the	desire	to	act	together.	Collective	commitment,	the	achievement	of	group	agency,	acts	through	joint-intention	that	is	formed	in	the	presence	of	shared	intentions,	a	shared	ethos,	and	shared	beliefs.	‘Group	members’	joint	intention	to	see	to	it	that	something	(group	ethos	–	the	accumulation	of	group	
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reason	and	collectivity)	is	or	will	be	the	case	even	on	conceptual	groups	generates	collective	commitment	for	the	member	to	see	to	it	that	‘p’”	(Tuomela	2013,	p.	45).		All	three	criteria	are	concerned	with	the	motivations	on	the	individual	level	to	act	for	the	good	of	the	group.	The	cornerstone	of	we-mode	is	shared	ethos.		
Social	Ontology	Through	an	Agent-based	Modeling	Perspective	Complex	systems	are	systems	that	include	individuals	acting	with	no	central	decision	maker.	Often	a	behavior	that	was	not	intended	by	the	individuals,	emerges	from	the	micro-behaviors	in	the	system.	I	apply	complex	system	techniques	to	entrepreneurial	behavior,	specifically	entrepreneurial	group	behavior.	There	are	quite	a	few	entrepreneurial	stories	that	their	success	seemed	to	emerge	from	a	set	of	unexplainable	circumstances	that	seem	to	be	hard	to	recreate.	Many	people	analyze	and	dissect	the	stories	to	be	able	to	study	and	reify	their	actions	and	behaviors.	However,	after	many	years	of	analysis	and	case	studies	there	is	not	a	clear-cut	how	to	list	of	steps	to	become	a	successful	entrepreneur.	If	for	a	moment	we	step	back	and	think	about	the	possibility	that	individual	entrepreneurs,	represented	as	agents	that	act	as	individuals,	are	motivated	by	a	certain	set	of	shared	beliefs	and	group	together,	a	new	vantage	point	for	a	different	perspective	of	study	has	been	established.	Once	grouped	together	they	are	still	operating	as	individuals	but	begin	to	identify	as	a	group,	to	form	group	agency.	There	is	no	central	decision	maker,	although	there	may	be	decision	maker	figure	(a.k.a.	‘the	boss’).	Because	of	the	nature	of	entrepreneurship,	the	single	decision	maker	is	there	as	a	representation	of	a	need	and	not	necessarily	the	central	diving	figure	(this	is	
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necessary	for	group	agency).	The	group	acts	overtime	and	creates	emergent	success,	culture,	or	change.		Scott	Page	suggests	that	diversity	in	groups	creates	a	larger	predictability	of	success.	He	also	suggests	that	individuals	use	a	certain	set	of	heuristics	for	their	decision	making	process,	the	heuristics	have	more	to	do	with	their	perception	of	reality	and	things	they	choose	to	accept	as	true.	When	combining	this	idea	on	perception	with	the	behavior	rules	from	group	agency	and	we-intentionality	from	Gilbert,	Tuomela,	and	others	it	changes	the	how	the	forming	rules	are	executed.	It	suggests	that	based	on	pre-conceived	notions	(which	Ruef	starts	to	talk	about	–	preconceived	notions	of	entrepreneurs	based	on	demographics)	people	make	decisions,	decisions	on	what	to	believe	and	why	to	believe	it.	This	would	have	a	great	influence	on	the	group	that	they	choose,	what	do	they	choose	to	see	as	most	important?	How	do	they	choose	this?	Ruef	suggests	that	the	group	that	an	entrepreneur	chooses	to	work	with	has	an	impact	on	the	formation	time	of	the	business	(Ruef	2010	p.	195).			The	meshing	of	social	ontology	and	agent-based	modeling	within	the	boundaries	of	entrepreneurship	opens	the	door	for	unique	discussion,	as	illustrated	above.	However,	it	is	the	regimen	of	agent-based	modeling	that	allows	such	theoretical	discussion	to	abound.	Inside	the	boundaries	of	agent-based	modeling	different	thought	tests	are	able	to	be	experimented	with	to	illustrate	the	processes	individuals	take	to	form	groups.	Additional	complexity	can	be	added	to	the	models	by	adding	an	environment	in	which	entrepreneurial	activity	and	impact	can	occur.	
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The	flexibility	of	agent-based	modeling	to	provide	a	framework	to	support	individual	attributes,	and	therefore	the	social	ontological	perspective,	a	global	environment,	the	economic	environment	in	which	entrepreneurial	groups	act,	and	the	all	of	the	possible	interactions	(agents	with	agents	and	agents	with	the	environment)	makes	it	the	perfect	mechanisms	to	complete	foundational	research	relating	to	entrepreneurship.		 	
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ODD	(Overview,	Design	Concepts,	Description)	of	Agent-based	
Model	The	ODD	is	a	standardized	design	approach	to	building	and	describing	agent-based	models.	It	was	created	by	a	large	group	of	modelers	in	2006	(Grimm,	et.	al.	2006)	and	updated	in	2010	so	as	to	make	model	review	more	efficient.	The	standard	design	includes	seven	elements:	purpose,	state	variables	and	scales,	process	overview,	design	concepts,	initialization,	input	data,	and	sub	models.	The	design	concepts	section	is	the	most	complex	and	requires	description	of	agent	behaviors	in	eleven	categories	(not	all	of	which	appear	in	a	given	agent-based	model).			 1. Basic	Principles	2. Emergent	Behavior	3. Adaption	by	Agents	4. Learning	5. Prediction	by	Agents	6. Sensing	by	Agents	of	Other	Agents	and	Patches	7. Interaction	Rules	8. Stochasticity	of	Variables	9. Formation	of	Collectives	10. Observation	(output	creation)		The	ODD	for	my	model	follows	below.		
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Overview	
Purpose:	To	increase	understanding	of	the	theories	of	Bratman,	Gilbert,	&	Tuomela’s	approach	on	collective	or	group	intentionality	using	Agent-based	modeling.		To	date	the	Agent-based	modeling	approach	has	not	been	used	in	the	study	of	social	ontology	theories.	These	models	to	not	exist	to	prove	or	disprove	the	mechanisms	of	action	in	the	social	ontological	approach,	rather	they	simply	provide	a	novel	mechanism	to	provide	scientific	structure	to	their	study.			In	addition,	this	model	acts	to	display	group	agency	using	the	conceptual	approach	proposed	by	Bratman,	Gilbert,	&	Tuomela	using	agent-based	modeling.	These	social	ontologists	have	only	tested	their	theories	using	thought	experiments,	and	have	not	used	a	qualitative	protocol	to	systematically	prove	or	disprove	their	assumptions	and	theories.	The	display	of	group	agency	is	critical	for	the	existence	of	entrepreneurial	groups.	The	models	in	this	ODD	are	working	to	provide	qualitative	proof	behind	the	existence	of	we-intentionality	to	ultimately	further	the	study	of	collective	entrepreneurship.			
State	Variables:			
Turtles	(NetLogo’s	generic	agents):	Entrepreneurial	minded	individuals:			State	variables	include:	
• Role:	1,	2,	or	3.	Fritz	Redlich	separates	active	roles	in	entrepreneurial	groups	into	the	innovator,	capitalist,	and	manager.	The	innovator,	in	the	most	traditional	sense,	is	the	‘entrepreneur’	or	the	‘dreamer’.	The	capitalist,	brings	the	money	and	know-how	to	finance	the	project.	The	manager	does	all	the	
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hard	dirty	work	of	details	to	bring	to	fruition	the	dreamers	dreams	(Redlich	1951).	Each	agent	can	be	only	one	of	these.	The	distinction	of	the	three	agent	types	is	set	in	the	initial	conditions.		
• Search	Radius:	1	–	20	patches.	The	search	radius	is	the	distance	each	turtle	can	‘see’	or	‘sense’	other	potential	turtles	to	determine	if	they	are	eligible	to	form	a	group.	The	search	radius	is	measure	from	the	center	of	a	patch	to	the	center	of	a	different	patch.																				
• Bratman	
• I-Intention:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	I-intention	is	basis	of	Bratman’s	approach	on	we-intentionality.	In	the	Bratman	model,	I-intention	must	be	present	to	participate	in	the	group	search.		
• Intention:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	After	the	search	process	has	begun	the	agent	searches	for	other	agents	with	intention	that	is	the	same	as	theirs.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Figure	1:	Illustration	of	Search	
Radius	in	Agent-based	Models	
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• Mesh:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	Agents	search	for	agents	that	are	able	to	mesh	their	sub-plans	together.		
• Gilbert	
• Prior	Commitment:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	Prior	commitment	is	the	first	step	of	we-intentionality	for	Gilbert.	In	the	Gilbert	model	prior	commitment	must	be	present	to	participate	in	the	group	search.	
• Intention:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	After	group	formation	has	occurred	the	intention	of	the	group	comes	to	a	consensus.		
• Tuomela		
• We-intention:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	We-intention	is	the	first	step	of	we-intentionality	for	Tuomela.	In	the	Tuomela	model	we-intention	must	be	present	to	participate	in	the	group	search.		
• Ethos:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	In	order	for	we-mode	group	action	to	occur	agents	must	share	the	same	‘ethos’.		
• Intention:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	After	the	search	process	has	begun	the	agent	searches	for	other	agents	with	intention	that	is	the	same	as	theirs.	
• Belief:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	Belief	in	the	ability	for	the	group	to	complete	the	collective	intention	is	necessary	for	we-intentionality.		
• Real-World	
• I-Intention:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	I-intention	is	representative	of	the	Bratman	model.		
• Intention:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	After	the	search	process	has	begun	the	agent	searches	for	other	agents	with	intention	that	is	the	
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same	as	theirs,	or	the	intention	comes	to	congruence.	Intention	is	present	in	all	proposed	models.		
• Mesh:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	Mesh	is	representative	of	the	Bratman	model.		
• Prior	Commitment:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	Prior	commitment	is	representative	of	the	Gilbert	model.		
• We-intention:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	We-intention	is	representative	of	the	Tuomela	model.		
• Ethos:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	Ethos	is	representative	of	the	Tuomela	model.		
• Belief:	Binary,	Present	or	Absent.	Belief	is	representative	of	the	Tuomela	model.			
Patches	(NetLogo’s	cells	in	spatial	array):	The	landscape	is	a	99	x	99	square	grid.	Each	patch	represents	a	specific	latent	opportunity.	The	agents	are	placed	on	a	particular	patch	through	stochastic	placement.	Agents	are	placed	on	patches	one	at	a	time	as	part	of	the	initial	conditions.	At	the	onset	of	the	group	search	process	multiple	agents	are	able	to	occupy	one	patch.	The	search	process	for	the	agents	is	primarily	focused	on	the	search	for	other	eligible	agents	for	group	formation.	However,	each	agent	is	only	able	to	see	a	limited	number	of	patches	based	on	their	search-radius,	and	therefore	a	limited	sub-section	of	their	world.		As	agents	find	suitable	group	members	the	patch	that	the	group	is	formed	becomes	the	new	‘home’	
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of	the	group,	this	patch	is	the	opportunity	the	entrepreneurial	group	is	acting	collectively	to	pursue.			 	
Global	Environment:	None			 	
Scales:		State	variables	will	either	be	scaled	from	1	–	10	or	binary	(present	or	absent).	Each	state	variable	is	described	above.			
Process	Overview:		Multiple	philosophers	of	social	ontology	have	developed	theories	as	to	how	and	why	people	share	we-intentionality.	These	models	test	each	philosopher’s	theory	using	the	rigor	of	Agent-based	modeling.	Each	author	will	first	be	tested	individually	and	then	all	three	theories	for	group	formation	will	be	allowed	to	exercise	at	the	same	time.	The	models	work	in	time	steps,	each	time	step	in	not	representative	of	a	specific	amount	of	time.	Proximity	to	each	agent	does	determine	the	speed	at	which	interaction	will	occur	however	it	does	not	represent	additional	variables.			Bratman:	
• At	each	time	step	individuals	search	for	other	individuals	or	existing	collectives	to	establish	membership.	The	individual	will	observe	possible	targets	within	its	search	radius,	and	then	move	toward	the	target.	Targets	for	each	experiment	are	
described	in	sub-model	below.		
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• If	an	encounter	is	completed	within	the	time	step,	the	agent	senses	the	attributes	of	the	other	agent	(individual	or	collective)	that	co-locates	on	the	patch	to	see	if	they	are	compatible	collective	partners.	(In	the	case	of	an	existing	collective,	this	will	be	governed	by	membership	size	limitations	and	by	the	class	of	agent	and	its	background).		
• If	membership	criteria	are	met,	then	the	agent	stays	for	the	next	time	step.		
• If	membership	is	not	met,	the	agent	restarts	the	search	process	in	the	next	time	step.		
• If	an	incipient	collective	exists	on	the	same	patch	(unaffiliated	individuals),	begin	negotiation	over	obligations	and	claims.	If	a	plan	in	created	within	bounds,	complete	firm	(collective	formation).		Details	in	relation	to	plan	in	Bratman	sub-
plan	below.		
• If	an	existing	collective	and	a	potential-member	individual	exist	on	the	same	patch	in	a	given	time	step	and	membership	criteria	were	established	in	a	prior	time	step,	new	member	intentionality	is	assessed	by	collective.	Individual	accepts	or	refuses.		
• If	accepts,	then	the	collective	membership	is	updated	in	the	time	step.		
• If	no	acceptance	occurs,	Individual	re-initiates	search.	
• If	all	members’	aspiration	levels	are	met,	the	collective	remains.		
• If	aspiration	levels	of	all	members	will	not	be	met	on	current	patch	the	collective	dissolves.	In	the	next	time	step,	each	individual	begins	search	process	to	find	new	collective	partners.	
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• At	the	end	of	each	time	step,	individual	state	variables	are	updated:	membership	with	collective	and	location.		
• At	the	end	of	each	time	step,	collectives	update	membership,	location,	and	status	of	duties	and	claims.			Gilbert:	
• At	each	time	step	individuals	search	for	other	individuals	or	existing	collectives	to	establish	membership.	The	individual	will	observe	possible	targets	within	its	search	radius,	and	then	move	toward	the	target.	Targets	for	each	experiment	are	
described	in	sub-model	below.		
• If	an	encounter	is	completed	within	the	time	step,	the	agent	senses	the	attributes	of	the	other	agent	(individual	or	collective)	that	co-locates	on	the	patch	to	see	if	they	are	compatible	collective	partners.	(In	the	case	of	an	existing	collective,	this	will	be	governed	by	membership	size	limitations	and	by	the	class	of	agent	and	its	background).		
• If	membership	criteria	are	met,	then	the	agent	stays	for	the	next	time	step.		
• If	membership	is	not	met,	the	agent	restarts	the	search	process	in	the	next	time	step.		
• If	an	incipient	collective	exists	on	the	same	patch	(unaffiliated	individuals),	begin	negotiation	over	obligations	and	claims.	If	a	plan	in	created	within	bounds,	complete	firm	(collective	formation).		Details	in	relation	to	plan	in	Gilbert	sub-
plan	below.		
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• If	an	existing	collective	and	a	potential-member	individual	exist	on	the	same	patch	in	a	given	time	step	and	membership	criteria	were	established	in	a	prior	time	step,	new	member	intentionality	is	assessed	by	collective.	Individual	accepts	or	refuses.		
• If	accepts,	then	the	collective	membership	is	updated	in	the	time	step.		
• If	no	acceptance	occurs,	Individual	re-initiates	search.	
• If	all	members’	aspiration	levels	are	met,	the	collective	remains.		
• If	aspiration	levels	of	all	members	will	not	be	met	on	current	patch	the	collective	dissolves.	In	the	next	time	step,	each	individual	begins	search	process	to	find	new	collective	partners.	
• At	the	end	of	each	time	step,	individual	state	variables	are	updated:	membership	with	collective	and	location.		
• At	the	end	of	each	time	step,	collectives	update	membership,	location,	and	status	of	duties	and	claims.			Tuomela:	
• At	each	time	step	individuals	search	for	other	individuals	or	existing	collectives	to	establish	membership.	The	individual	will	observe	possible	targets	within	its	search	radius,	and	then	move	toward	the	target.	Targets	for	each	experiment	are	
described	in	sub-model	below.		
• If	an	encounter	is	completed	within	the	time	step,	the	agent	senses	the	attributes	of	the	other	agent	(individual	or	collective)	that	co-locates	on	the	patch	to	see	if	they	are	compatible	collective	partners.	(In	the	case	of	an	existing	collective,	this	
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will	be	governed	by	membership	size	limitations	and	by	the	class	of	agent	and	its	background).		
• If	membership	criteria	are	met,	then	the	agent	stays	for	the	next	time	step.		
• If	membership	is	not	met,	the	agent	restarts	the	search	process	in	the	next	time	step.		
• If	an	incipient	collective	exists	on	the	same	patch	(unaffiliated	individuals),	begin	negotiation	over	obligations	and	claims.	If	a	plan	in	created	within	bounds,	complete	firm	(collective	formation).		Details	in	relation	to	plan	in	Tuomela	sub-
plan	below.		
• If	an	existing	collective	and	a	potential-member	individual	exist	on	the	same	patch	in	a	given	time	step	and	membership	criteria	were	established	in	a	prior	time	step,	new	member	intentionality	is	assessed	by	collective.	Individual	accepts	or	refuses.		
• If	accepts,	then	the	collective	membership	is	updated	in	the	time	step.		
• If	no	acceptance	occurs,	Individual	re-initiates	search.	
• If	all	members’	aspiration	levels	are	met,	the	collective	remains.		
• If	aspiration	levels	of	all	members	will	not	be	met	on	current	patch	the	collective	dissolves.	In	the	next	time	step,	each	individual	begins	search	process	to	find	new	collective	partners.	
• At	the	end	of	each	time	step,	individual	state	variables	are	updated:	membership	with	collective	and	location.		
• At	the	end	of	each	time	step,	collectives	update	membership,	location,	and	status	of	duties	and	claims.		
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	Real	World:		
• At	each	time	step	individuals	search	for	other	individuals	or	existing	collectives	to	establish	membership.	The	individual	will	observe	possible	targets	within	its	search	radius,	and	then	move	toward	the	target.	Targets	for	each	experiment	are	
described	in	sub-model	below.		
• If	an	encounter	is	completed	within	the	time	step,	the	agent	senses	the	attributes	of	the	other	agent	(individual	or	collective)	that	co-locates	on	the	patch	to	see	if	they	are	compatible	collective	partners.	(In	the	case	of	an	existing	collective,	this	will	be	governed	by	membership	size	limitations	and	by	the	class	of	agent	and	its	background).		
• If	membership	criteria	are	met,	then	the	agent	stays	for	the	next	time	step.		
• If	membership	is	not	met,	the	agent	restarts	the	search	process	in	the	next	time	step.		
• If	an	incipient	collective	exists	on	the	same	patch	(unaffiliated	individuals),	begin	negotiation	over	obligations	and	claims.	If	a	plan	in	created	within	bounds,	complete	firm	(collective	formation).		Details	in	relation	to	plan	in	Real-World	
sub-plan	below.		
• If	an	existing	collective	and	a	potential-member	individual	exist	on	the	same	patch	in	a	given	time	step	and	membership	criteria	were	established	in	a	prior	time	step,	new	member	intentionality	is	assessed	by	collective.	Individual	accepts	or	refuses.		
• If	accepts,	then	the	collective	membership	is	updated	in	the	time	step.		
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• If	no	acceptance	occurs,	Individual	re-initiates	search.	
• If	all	members’	aspiration	levels	are	met,	the	collective	remains.		
• If	aspiration	levels	of	all	members	will	not	be	met	on	current	patch	the	collective	dissolves.	In	the	next	time	step,	each	individual	begins	search	process	to	find	new	collective	partners.	
• At	the	end	of	each	time	step,	individual	state	variables	are	updated:	membership	with	collective	and	location.		
• At	the	end	of	each	time	step,	collectives	update	membership,	location,	and	status	of	duties	and	claims.		
	
Design	Concepts	Design	Concepts:	Philosophers	have	contemplated	why	people	come	together;	what	force	is	the	motivation	for	an	individual	to	release	control	and	be	willing	to	work	together	with	others?			Group	work	facilitated	by	we-intentionality	is	present	in	our	everyday	life.	Some	examples	include:	1)	making	hollandaise	sauce	with	a	friend,	2)	cleaning	the	house	with	your	roommate,	or	3)	completing	a	paper	with	a	group	member.	However,	without	careful	consideration	to	the	task	it	is	easy	for	two	individuals	to	work	on	separate	goals,	which	happen	to	have	the	same	outcome.	According	to	the	literature	there	are	specific	guidelines	as	to	when	we-intentionality	is	present.	Michael	Bratman	believes	we-intentionality	is	present	when	two	or	more	individuals	have	a	shared	plan	to	accomplish	a	single	intention.		
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Margaret	Gilbert	relies	upon	prior	commitments	to	form	the	structural	glue	that	motivates	individuals	to	act	together	to	achieve	group	agency.	Raimo	Tuomela	relies	upon	the	existence	of	shared	ethos	(or	inner	motivating	belief	system)	of	individuals	to	support	group	formation.	To-date	we-intentionality	has	only	been	written	and	thought	about	conceptually.	It	is	the	intention	of	these	Agent-based	models	to	model	group	formation,	with	special	consideration	taken	to	group	formation	of	entrepreneurs.			The	basic	principles	of	the	model	derive	from	individual-based	entrepreneurial	behaviors	(e.g.	search	for	opportunities	in	the	business	environment)	and	from	the	design	principle	that	entrepreneurial	organizations	must	consist	of	three	primary	entrepreneurial	functions,	represented	by	three	different	agents:	innovation,	uncertainty-bearing,	and	firm	formation.	The	foregoing	design	principle	derives	from	heterodox	economics	and	the	history	of	entrepreneurship.	Thus,	the	model	will	not	allow	for	the	instantiation	of	an	entrepreneurial	firm	unless	all	three	functions/agents	exist	in	the	same	location	in	the	landscape.	The	formation	of	the	collective	requires	the	establishment	of	we-intentionality	for	group	action	upon	the	joint	outcomes	(income)	of	the	collective.	This	comes	from	social	ontology	and	follows	a	number	of	possible	paths	from	I-intentionality	of	the	individual	agents	to	we-intentionality	of	the	group	members	to	active	joint	agency	(and	economic	action	as	a	collective	entity).	The	collective	entity	“harvests”	earnings	from	the	landscape	patch	and	periodically	assesses	the	landscape	to	see	if	higher-outcome	patches	are	
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available	for	exploitation.	Eventually,	collectives	may	disband	if	the	earnings	cannot	meet	the	aspirations	of	individual	agents	and	the	individual	claims	upon	them.		The	sections	below	consider	the	specific	behaviors	and	other	design	elements	from	the	ODD	protocol	outlined	above	(page	32).			
Emergence:	Individual	behaviors	are	primarily	dependent	upon	individual	state	variables	and	interaction	rules	defined	for	collective	formation	and	membership.	After	groups	of	agents	form	the	group	will	be	the	representative	agent	for	the	opportunity.	Agents	have	as	part	of	their	attributes	intentionality	and	we-intentionality.	When	agents	are	close	enough	to	form	a	group	the	formation	of	the	group	implies	that	the	individuals’	we-intentionality	is	into	morphed	to	group-agency	so	that	the	active	agent	is	now	the	group	and	no	longer	the	individuals.	The	emergent	behavior	of	the	model	is	the	action	of	the	new	agent,	as	an	agglomeration	of	the	individuals.			
Adaptation:	Not	present	in	this	model.	In	future	models	agents	could	adapt	their	level	of	intention,	belief,	and	cooperation	after	experience	with	group	formation.		 	
Fitness:	Not	present	in	this	model.	In	future	models	agents	could	react	to	their	environment	based	on	their	adaption	of	intention,	belief,	and	cooperation	to	become	more	attractive	group	members	for	the	search	process.		
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Objectives:	Although	adaption	and	fitness	are	not	present	in	this	early	model	and	therefore	it	is	not	necessary	for	the	objectives	of	the	individuals	to	be	explicitly	listed,	I	believe	it	to	be	beneficial	to	mention	that	in	this	model	individuals	are	guided	by	the	interaction	rules	in	place	that	operate	under	a	hierarchy	of	objectives	of	each	individual	dependent	upon	the	model	in	operation.			
Prediction:	Each	agent	will	predict	the	expected	payoffs	of	each	opportunity.	This	will	help	determine	if	they	more	toward	an	opportunity.	Each	agent	will		 predict	1)	the	value	of	opportunity	as	the	individual	and	2)	the	capacity	each	agent	has	working	together	and	still	receive	a	high	payoff	as	an	individual.	The	required	payoff	will	be	stochastically	distributed.				
Sensing:	Currently	all	individuals	can	see	others	levels	of	intention,	belief,	cooperation	and	willingness	to	write	a	plan.	Agents	also	are	able	to	sense	if	they	have	shared	connections	with	agents	or	share	an	‘ethos’.		Special	sensing	abilities	will	be	given	to	certain	opportunities	because	of	different	business	types.	The	state	variable	‘trust’	will	also	determine	how	much	each	agent	is	able	to	sense.			Interactions:	All	agents	interact	together.	Each	agent	‘meets’	to	gain	knowledge	of	other	agents’	behaviors.	From	there	each	experiment	is	different	for	Bratman,	Gilbert,	&	Tuomela.			 	
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Stochasticity:	As	mentioned	earlier,	required	payoff	will	be	an	endowed	initial	condition	and	is	deterministic.			 	
Collectives:	Collectives	are	formed	through	emergent	behavior.	Once	collectives	have	been	formed	the	group	will	then	act	on	behalf	of	the	opportunity.	Breeds	of	each	type	of	group	we-intentionality	will	then	act	as	the	agent.			
Observation:	The	world	display	shows	the	location	of	each	agent	on	the	opportunity	landscape.	Additional	outputs	will	be	counters	for	those	in	group	formation	and	those	grouped	and	exploiting	opportunities.		
	
Details		
Initialization:	For	each	model,	agents	are	given	individual	attributes	determined	by	the	social	ontological	perspective	of	the	model.	Each	model	is	described	in	detail	below	as	sub-models.	The	initialization	of	each	model	is	the	same.	Each	model	has	30	turtles	(agents)	of	each	agent	role	(role	1,	2,	and	3)	for	a	total	of	90	agents	that	can	form	a	maximum	of	30	groups.	Within	each	role	agents	are	given	all	individual	attributes	randomly,	except	for	intention.	The	absence	of	intention	is	received	by	exactly	15	of	each	role	type,	and	the	presence	of	intention	is	received	by	exactly	15	of	each	role	type.		
Input:	The	environment	is	assumed	to	be	constant,	no	input	data	is	necessary.		
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Sub-models:	All	model	parameters	for	the	environment	are	the	same	for	all	models	represented.	A	model	was	designed	to	represent	each	ontological	view	as	well	as	a	model	designed	to	represent	an	environment	with	all	views	operating	at	once.	In	the	process	overview	I	eluded	to	each	model’s	targets	for	group	members	and	the	negotiation	necessary	to	complete	group	formation.	I	will	describe	in	detail,	using	code	as	explanation,	each	of	the	models	targets	and	negotiation	requirements.		
• Bratman	
o Target:	The	target	attribute	for	group	formation	in	the	Bratman	model	is	I-intention.	I-intention	is	representative	of	an	agent’s	intention	to	complete	a	group-task	on	an	individual	level.	All	group	members	much	have	I-intention	to	form	a	Bratman	group.	I-intention	must	equal	1.										
o Negotiation:	Once	the	group	search	has	begun,	agents	search	for	agents	with	different	roles	than	themselves,	the	presence	of	intention,	and	the	ability	to	mesh	sub-plans.					
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o Completion	of	model:	The	model	is	complete	once	any	agents	with	a	given	role	do	not	remain	with	I-intention	present.							
• Gilbert		
o Target:	The	target	attribute	for	group	formation	in	the	Gilbert	model	is	prior	commitments.	Prior	commitments	are	representative	of	an	agent’s	relationship	with	agents	prior	to	group	search.	All	group	members	must	share	a	prior	commitment	to	form	a	group	in	the	Gilbert	model.	Prior	commitment	must	equal	1.						
o Negotiation:	Once	the	group	search	has	begun,	agents	search	for	agents	with	different	roles	and	prior	commitments	to	form	groups.	Intention	of	the	agent	is	a	state	variable,	however	the	intention	of	the	agent	is	morphed	to	be	like	all	group	members	once	paired	with	group	agents	of	prior	commitments.			
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o Completion	of	model:	The	model	is	complete	once	any	agents	with	a	given	role	do	not	remain	with	prior	commitments	present.			
o 	
• Tuomela		
o Target:	The	target	attribute	for	group	formation	in	the	Tuomela	model	is	we-intention.	We-intention	is	representative	of	an	agent’s	desire	to	complete	a	group-task	on	an	individual	level,	taking	a	holism	approach	to	intention.	All	group	members	much	have	we-intention	to	form	a	Tuomela	group.	We-intention	must	equal	1.									
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o Negotiation:	Once	the	group	search	has	begun,	agents	search	for	agents	with	different	roles	than	themselves,	the	presence	of	intention,	the	presence	of	ethos,	and	the	presence	of	belief.				
o Completion	of	model:	The	model	is	complete	once	any	agents	with	a	particular	role	do	not	remain	with	we-intention	present.							
• Real-World	(a	world	where	all	three	ontological	accounts	are	possible)	
o Target:	The	target	attribute	for	group	formation	in	the	real-world	model	is	dependent	upon	the	sub-model	being	processed	at	the	time.	Bratman,	Gilbert,	and	Tuomela	are	all	represented	in	the	real-world	model.	All	of	the	targets	for	these	models	are	described	above.							
o Negotiation:	Once	the	group	search	has	begun	agents	search	for	agents	with	different	roles	than	themselves	that	qualify	to	the	particular	sub-model	being	processed	at	the	time.	All	of	the	negotiation	requirements	for	the	sub-models	are	described	above.		
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o Completion	of	model:	This	model	runs	indefinitely	in	the	current	design.			 	
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Model	Results	Four	models	are	displayed	for	the	purpose	of	demonstration	of	group	formation	using	agent-based	modeling.	It	is	expected	that	each	model	will	simply	represent	the	agents	ability	to	participate	in	a	search	process	to	find	group	members	and	then	achieve	group	agency	via	necessary	conditions	for	we-intentionality.	Inside	each	model	the	search	radius	will	be	tested	to	confirm	that	the	larger	an	area	an	agent	can	search	for	potential	group	members	the	quicker	group	formation	is	completed.		In	some	of	the	models	it	takes	many	steps	to	form	all	groups,	in	these	models	restrictions	were	added	to	the	model	testing	to	begin	preforming	the	next	test	after	5000	time	steps.	In	these	models	I	expect	the	average	number	of	time	steps	for	group	formation	to	decrease	from	5000	as	search	radius	increases.		NetLogo	was	used	for	the	agent-based	modeling	of	the	group	formation	(Railsback	2012).	Figure	1	depicts	the	home	screen	for	all	models.		
	
	
	
	
	
			
Figure	2:	NetLogo	home	screen	for	all	models	depicted	in	this	thesis		
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The	setup	button	is	the	trigger	for	the	creation	of	all	of	the	agents	on	the	screen.	The	go	button	prompts	the	agents	to	act	according	to	their	individual	attributes	and	interact	with	other	surrounding	agents.	The	‘sr’	button,	is	a	slider,	allowing	for	the	search	radius	(Search	radius	is	represented	by	‘sr’	within	the	model	coding.	The	search	radius	is	the	area	each	agent	can	sense	other	agents	and	access	their	individual	attributes)	of	each	individual	agent	to	be	modified	quickly	from	the	home	screen.	Three	different	agents	roles	are	represented	in	the	model	and	depicted	by	the	different	color	of	agents	(i.e.	1	=	innovator,	2	=	capitalist,	and	3	=	manager).	The	three	roles	are	necessary	to	insure	that	groups	are	made	up	of	different	types	of	individuals.																							
Figure	3:	NetLogo	completed	model		
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When	agents	identify	possible	other	agents	to	form	a	group	with	the	agents	relocate	and	access	the	qualities	of	the	other	agents.	If	agents	are	suitable	for	group	formation	then	all	agents	change	color	to	red	(or	some	other	predetermined	color)	and	stop	participating	in	the	group	search.	The	red	color	indicates	the	achievement	of	group	agency.	Each	agent-based	model	has	90	turtles	with	30	turtles	in	each	role,	for	a	possibility	of	the	formation	of	30	three-agent	groups	during	each	experiment.		For	each	model	I	will	present	the	numbers	of	groups	formed	and	the	amount	of	time	it	took	for	all	possible	groups	to	form,	dependent	upon	the	search	radius.	Each	experiment	is	the	average	of	25	model	trials.		
Bratman	The	Bratman	model	requires	I-intention	to	participate	in	the	search	process.	Expected	results	were	found	during	the	Bratman	model	exercise.	Roughly	15%	of	total	potential	groups	formed	at	search	radius	five,	20%	of	total	potential	groups	formed	at	search	radius	ten,	23%	of	total	potential	groups	formed	at	search	radius	fifteen,	and	24%	of	total	potential	groups	formed	at	search	radius	twenty.		As	the	search	radius	increased	agents	were	able	to	form	groups	at	a	quicker	rate.	The	Bratman	model	was	limited	to	5000	time	steps.		Search	Radius	 Average	#	of	Groups	Formed	 Average	#	of	Time	Steps	for	all	Agents	to	Form	Groups	5	 4.69	 5,000.00	10	 6.04	 4,884.84	15	 6.97	 4,881.60	20	 7.40	 3,866.84	
Table	2:	Bratman	Agent-based	Modeling	Results		
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Gilbert	The	Gilbert	model	requires	prior-commitment	to	participate	in	the	search	process.	Expected	results	were	found	during	the	Gilbert	model	exercise.	Roughly	40%	of	total	potential	groups	formed,	as	the	search	radius	increased	agents	were	able	to	form	groups	at	a	quicker	rate.		Search	Radius	 Average	#	of	Groups	Formed	 Average	#	of	Time	Steps	for	all	Agents	to	Form	Groups	5	 11.6	 15,739.18	10	 11.96	 6,541.10	15	 11.78	 2,445.22	20	 11.58	 1,186.18	
Table	3:	Gilbert	Agent-based	Modeling	Results	
Tuomela	The	Tuomela	model	requires	we-intention	to	participate	in	the	search	process.	Expected	results	were	found	during	the	Tuomela	model	exercise.	Roughly	8%	of	total	potential	groups	formed	at	search	radius	five,	16%	of	total	potential	groups	formed	at	search	radius	ten,	18.5%	of	total	potential	groups	formed	at	search	radius	fifteen,	and	19%	of	total	potential	groups	formed	at	search	radius	twenty.		As	the	search	radius	increased	agents	were	able	to	form	groups	at	a	quicker	rate,	because	of	the	increased	number	of	groups	formed.	The	Tuomela	model	was	limited	to	5000	times	steps.		 Search	Radius	 Average	#	of	Groups	Formed	 Average	#	of	Time	Steps	for	all	Agents	to	Form	Groups	5	 2.4	 5,000.00	10	 4.84	 5,000.00	15	 5.56	 5,000.00	20	 5.68	 5,000.00	
Table	4:	Tuomela	Agent-based	Modeling	Results			
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Real-World		The	real-world	model	tests	the	interaction	that	occurs	when	multiple	methods	of	group	formation	are	present.	This	model	is	important	in	its	testing	to	simply	illustrate	the	ability	for	all	three	techniques	to	be	present	in	one	environment	and	all	three	sub-models	continue	to	operate.	The	Bratman	method	for	group	formation	formed	the	most	groups	with	a	search	radius	of	5	or	10.	The	Gilbert	method	formed	the	most	groups	with	a	search	radius	of	15	or	20.	This	is	expected	because	of	the	lack	of	agent	requirements	for	group	formation	for	both	Bratman	and	Gilbert.	With	a	smaller	search	radius	Bratman	formed	more	groups	because	his	search	process	was	the	first	sub-model	to	proceed,	followed	by	Gilbert	and	then	Tuomela.	Tuomela	had	the	fewest	groups	formed	because	of	the	high	number	of	qualifiers	necessary	for	group	formation.	Figure	three	below	shows	a	NetLogo	model	screen	with	all	three	group	formations	occurring	(represented	by	the	red,	orange,	and	yellow	agents).			 Search	Radius	 Average	#	of	Groups	Formed	 Bratman	Groups	 Gilbert	Groups	 Tuomela	Groups	 Avg.	#	of	Times	Steps	for	All	Agents	to	Form	Groups	5	 3.68	 1.80	 1.24	 0.63	 5,000.00	10	 4.64	 1.94	 1.91	 0.79	 5,000.00	15	 5.36	 1.99	 2.17	 1.19	 5,000.00	20	 4.97	 2.03	 2.23	 0.71	 5,000.00	
Table	5:	Real-World	Agent-based	Modeling	Results											
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						 					 Figure	4:	Real-World	Model	NetLogo	Representation		
Further	Study	The	exercise	of	completing	agent-based	models	for	the	illustration	of	social	ontology	present	in	group	formation	was	the	purpose	of	this	thesis.	That	is,	these	models	examine	the	dynamics	of	team	formation	under	three	specific	ontological	accounts.	It	is	designed	with	incipient	flexibility	to	change	the	distribution	of	agent	types,	size	of	the	landscape,	and	the	mobility	of	agents.		Additional	research	needs	to	be	completed	using	the	backbone	created	here,	to	study,	in-depth,	the	impact	a	particular	ontology	has	on	group	formation.	The	models	can	then	be	further	expanded	to	represent	a	specific	economic	environment	in	which	the	groups	formed	can	then	exploit	opportunities.			
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Contrary	to	the	current	model,	in	which	I	assume	occupation	of	the	same	patch	indicates	group	agency,	a	model	needs	to	be	developed	in	which	the	collective	group	formed	then	interacts	with	the	environment	as	one	agent.		Economic	measures	can	then	be	monitored.	For	example,	earnings	of	the	collective	could	emerge	from	interaction	between	the	collective	and	the	landscape	patch	(harvest)	according	to	landscape-level	rules,	competitive	effects	that	arise	from	the	juxtaposition	of	other	collectives,	and	the	speed	at	which	different	collectives	form	on	the	landscape.	It	will	be	interesting	to	explicitly	model	the	potential	economic	payoffs	from	landscape	patches,	so	as	to	see	how	the	collectives	complete	with	each	other	as	group	agents	(in	the	list	and	Pettit	sense).			 	
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Conclusion			This	study	of	group	entrepreneurship	is	completely	reliant	upon	understanding	the	social	ontology	of	the	individuals	comprising	the	group.	Contrary	to	the	business	management	or	social	science	approach	to	entrepreneurship,	the	best	way	to	study	entrepreneurship	is	a	hybrid	individual	–	group	perspective.	The	individual’s	attributes	will	define	the	method	to	which	group	formation	occurs,	and	therefore	influence	the	structure	and	governance	of	the	entrepreneurial	group.	The	governance	is	the	dominant	force	in	the	implementation	of	group	agency	at	a	human	level.			Group	agency	was	easily	achieved	in	a	computer	model	simulation.	In	further	development	of	the	model,	individuals	could	have	the	opportunity	to	defect	from	the	formed	group	and	act	outside	of	group	agency.	However,	to	best	understand	the	governance	necessary	to	force	group	agency,	it	is	critical	to	trace	and	understand	the	social	ontology	of	the	individuals	that	caused	the	group	formation.	That	is	the	purpose	of	this	thesis.	I	defend	group	entrepreneurship	through	an	extensive	literature	review	of	collective	intentionality	and	group	agency	leading	to	an	agent-based	model	of	group	formation.		I	believe	collective	intentionality	is	the	motivation	for	the	action	of	group	formation.	However,	because	of	the	complexity	of	human	nature	the	philosophers	who	study	intentionality	cannot	agree	on	one	definition.	Michael	Bratman,	Margaret	Gilbert,	and	Raimo	Tuomela	all	have	different	mechanisms	for	how	individual	we-intentionality	leads	to	group	agency.	I	systematically	broke	down	and	compared	all	three	theories	finishing	my	analysis	
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with	a	comparison	in	agent-based	modeling	using	NetLogo.	Agent-based	modeling	allows	for	a	model	simulation	of	group	behavior	and	emergent	phenomena	while	accounting	for	the	differences	in	individuals,	local	interactions,	and	adaptive	behavior	of	the	individuals.				The	immediate	implication	of	the	models	presented	is	the	inter-disciplinary	proposition	of	a	new	framework	for	group	formation.	The	group	formation	itself	is	not	the	focus;	rather	it	is	the	approach	to	the	study	of	the	group	formation.	Group	formation	studied	only	under	the	umbrella	of	ontology	provides	no	framework	to	quantitatively	analyze	the	impact	changes	to	the	ontology	has	on	groups.	Economics	rarely	studies	the	group	formation,	but	only	the	consequences	of	groups.	With	the	use	of	ecological	methods	I	was	able	to	draw	a	connection	between	the	study	of	the	individual	in	ontology	and	the	study	of	the	group	in	economics.	This	connection	builds	a	valuable	framework	for	further	work	to	grow	from	and	increase	the	understanding	of	the	impact	individuals	have	on	the	macro-environment.			Further	reaching	implications	of	this	work	expand	into	the	increased	knowledge	of	entrepreneurial	groups	to	help	support	the	study	of	entrepreneurial	success.	By	adding	sophistication	to	the	agent-based	models	presented	in	this	thesis	substantial	work	can	be	done	to	begin	to	test	variables	that	lead	to	entrepreneurial	success.	By	reducing	the	subject	of	study	down	to	the	intention	of	the	individual	the	field	of	entrepreneurship	now	has	a	vehicle	to	test	and	begin	to	understand	why	some	entrepreneurial	ventures	thrive.	In	addition,	once	the	individual	attributes	have	
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been	identified	the	flexibility	to	add	environmental	factors	is	now	present.	It	becomes	possible	to	ask	questions	as	poignant	as,	“What	type	of	entrepreneurial	group	survived	and	thrived	during	the	economic	environment	of	the	American	Great	Depression?”.	Although,	this	approach	cannot	predict	future	success	it	can	be	a	tool	to	provide	increased	understanding	to	the	mysterious	success	of	entrepreneurs.						 	
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